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This study provides a historical overview of the development of the carrier’s obligation to maintain 
a seaworthy vessel in contracts of carriage by sea, as well as a comparative analysis of the extent 
and duration of this obligation under the Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, 1968 (the Hague Visby Rules) 
and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly 
or Partly by Sea, 2008 (the Rotterdam Rules).  
The comparative analysis of the two carriage regimes undertaken in this study is of importance 
from a South African perspective as it examines whether the country should ratify the Rotterdam 
Rules in accordance with the recommendation made under the ‘Operation Phakisa’ project. The 
writer will briefly elaborate on the background and objectives of this governmental project in the 
study.  
This study briefly examines good shipping practices under the International Safety Management 
Code, 1994 (the ISM Code) and International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, 2002 (the ISPS 
Code) in the context of whether the extension of the duration of the carrier’s obligation to provide 
a seaworthy vessel under the Rotterdam Rules, imposes any additional duties on the ship owner. 
The study also explores the requirements that the parties to a cargo claim have to meet by analysing 
the burden of proof under both the Hague Visby and Rotterdam Rules.  This examination includes 
an overview of the commonly invoked exceptions contained in both carriage regimes, particularly 
the negligent navigation exception and the reasons and possible cost implications of excluding this 
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction, Purpose Statement and Chapter Overview 
 
1.1 Introduction 
One of the most contentious issues in the maritime trade industry is the balancing of the competing 
interests of the ship owner and the cargo owner in cargo claims. With the development of each 
international carriage regime, drafters attempt to bring about a balance between these competing 
interests. An in-depth analysis of the standard and duration of the ship owner’s obligation in 
maintaining a seaworthy vessel as well as any immunities allowing the carriers to escape liability 
under each of the prevailing regimes, enables us to determine whether these regimes’ operate in 
favour of one party or the other. 
At common law, ship owners were bound by an absolute obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel. 
The United States Harter Act of 1893 (the Harter Act) diluted this obligation to one of ‘due 
diligence’. The subsequent International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
relating to Bills of Lading, 1924 (the Hague Rules) and the Protocol to Amend the International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, 1968 (the  
Hague Visby Rules) retained this watered down obligation. Most maritime trading nations have 
incorporated one or the other of these two regimes (the Hague and Hague Visby Rules) into their 
law and these regimes are therefore considered to be the prevailing carriage regimes. Many cargo 
owning nations are of the view that the Hague Visby Rules are in dire need of modernisation and 
unfairly operate in favour of the ship owner. The United Nations Convention on the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea, 1978 (the Hamburg Rules), which followed on from the Hague Visby Rules were 
drafted  in an attempt to modernise these regimes and to provide a fairer balance in the competing 
interests of the contracting parties; however, these have not been widely accepted or ratified. More 
recently, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods 
Wholly or Partly by Sea, 2008 (the Rotterdam Rules), were created with the hopes of attaining 
wider acceptance than the Hamburg Rules.  
1.2 Purpose Statement of the Study 
The writer will examine the abovementioned carriage regimes and explore the domestic initiatives 
governing the carriage of goods by sea in South Africa.  
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The focus of this dissertation is to ascertain the scope and extent of the carrier’s obligation to 
maintain a seaworthy vessel under both the Hague Visby and Rotterdam Rules and to determine 
whether there is a material difference between the two regimes in this respect. This question is of 
importance as it is at the core of cargo claims resulting from the loss or damage of goods carried 
by sea and therefore at the heart of maritime trade. 
There are various difference in the nature and extent of the carrier’s liability and the requirements 
of proof in a cargo claim as set out under the Hague Visby and Rotterdam Rules. This study 
undertakes to explore these differences and the effectiveness and implications thereof.  
In order to determine the effectiveness of the proposed extension of the carrier’s liability under the 
Rotterdam Rules, the writer will examine good shipping practices that ship owners who are from 
member states of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (the SOLAS 
Convention) are already obliged to comply with under the International Safety Management Code, 
1994 (the ISM Code) and International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, 2002 (the ISPS 
Code). Such examination will allow the writer to determine whether the Rotterdam Rules actually 
extend the duration of the carrier’s liability or whether this proposed extension of the carrier’s 
liability is merely a reiteration of existing safety standards and codes that most ship owners are 
already obliged to comply with.  
As part of the comparative analysis undertaken in this study, the writer will discuss the nature of 
the burden of proof requirements that each party to a cargo claim has to discharge under the 
different carriage regimes. If the vessel is proven to be seaworthy, the carrier may rely on one of 
the exceptions provided for in the Hague Visby Rules in order to escape liability. The writer will 
therefore also briefly examine the commonly invoked exceptions under the different carriage 
regimes; specifically the negligent navigation exception and the reasons for its exclusion under the 
more recently drafted Rotterdam Rules. There is a perception in the maritime trade industry that 
the possible abolishment of the negligent navigation exception would bring about an unnecessary 
cost implication to the ship owner. This perception stems from the fact that under the Rotterdam 
Rules, the carrier may not escape liability for the negligent navigation or management of the vessel 
by the master or crew members, resulting in cargo loss or damage. In this study the writer will 
explore the merits of this point.  
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This study is of specific importance in South Africa, due to government’s recent commitment to 
‘the Operation Phakisa’ project. One of the key initiatives of this governmental project is the 
review of ocean specific legislation, which explores the possible ratification of the Rotterdam 
Rules - should the Rules gain wide acceptance from South Africa’s major trading partners. The 
writer will explore the outcome of this point and provide recommendations based on the findings 
of the research undertaken. 
1.3 Chapter Overview 
Chapter 1 is an introduction to this study. This chapter provides the purpose statement and a 
chapter breakdown. 
Chapter 2 explores the historical background and development of the laws, international 
conventions and domestic initiatives regulating the carriage of goods by sea.  
Chapter 3 is an examination of the concept of seaworthiness and the elements comprising it. This 
chapter also includes a discussion of terminology (by examining the interpretation of relevant 
provisions by both foreign and South African courts) used in the Hague Visby Rules. In addition, 
this chapter also examines the duration of the seaworthiness obligation under the Hague Visby and 
Rotterdam Rules.  
Chapter 4 provides a discussion of good shipping practices under the ISM and ISPS codes in the 
context of whether the extension of the duration of the carrier’s obligation to provide a seaworthy 
vessel under the Rotterdam Rules creates any onerous duties and cost implications for the ship 
owner. 
Chapter 5 outlines and comparatively discusses the burden and order of proof in cargo claims 
under the Hague Visby and Rotterdam Rules. In addition, this chapter also examines the exceptions 
found under the immunity clauses in both carriage regimes that allow the carrier to limit its 
liability.  
Chapter 6 is the conclusion to this study. This chapter presents a summary of the findings of the 




2 Chapter 2: Historical Background of the Seaworthiness Obligation 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the writer traces the historical background of the carrier’s obligation to provide a 
seaworthy vessel in a contract of carriage of goods to provide a seaworthy vessel. An examination 
of how this obligation has evolved from its strictest form under Roman and later English law, to 
that of the onus of proving the exercise of due diligence as reflected in subsequent international 
carriage liability regimes, provides the context for the development of this obligation and the 
reasons thereof. 
2.2 The roots of carriage of goods by sea and the carrier’s obligation to maintain a 
seaworthy vessel prior to the 19th century 
The growth of international trade through time brought about a need for uniformity and legal 
certainty in the laws regulating the carriage of goods sold internationally. Since the 19th century, 
there have been various initiatives to try and harmonise the laws governing the international 
carriage of goods by sea. Many of these initiatives, including the current international carriage 
regimes governing these are predominantly rooted in English common law.1 While English law 
provides the main foundation for these international initiatives, Roman law cannot be ignored as 
the carrier’s obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel under English law can be traced back to its 
historical roots of strict liability derived from Roman law. 
2.2.1 Roman law 
Under Roman law, cargo owners had to discharge the burdensome onus of proving fault or dolus 
on the part of the ship owner in order to successfully claim for damage or loss of goods carried.2 
The enactment of the Praetor’s Edict (between 75BC-78BC), was to a certain extent, aimed at 
lifting this burdensome onus of proof placed upon the cargo owner, by imposing the ‘strict liability’ 
to provide a seaworthy vessel upon the ship owner.3 The edict is an ancient Roman law concept, 
referring to a declaration of principles made by the Praetor.4 
                                                          
1 J Hare Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2 ed (2009) at page 618. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 A Praetor was a person elected as a magistrate and took control of administering justice within the city of Rome. F 
Du Bois Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) at page 968. 
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In an attempt to try and balance the interests of the cargo owners and those of ship owners, Roman 
law commentators and legislators sought to give effect to two exceptions that a carrier could rely 
on in a cargo claim against it, thereby escaping the strict liability imposed upon it. These exceptions 
were: 
i. if the loss or damage to goods occurred as a result of Viz Major (acts of God), or 
ii. in the case of domnum fatale - the occurrence of an inevitable accident beyond the 
control of the carrier, causing damage or loss of cargo e.g. ship wrecks or piracy.5  
Under Roman law, the absolute obligation to maintain a seaworthy vessel was vested in the ship 
owner, subject only to the abovementioned exceptions. 
2.2.2 English law 
As mentioned above, the Roman law concept of the carrier’s strict liability was adopted into 
English law. This was enacted through the concept of bailment.6 
The strict liability imposed on the carrier has been modified and softened over the years due to a 
number of commercial and practical considerations necessary to facilitate the development of 
international trade.  These modifications included subjecting such liability to a limited list of 
commonly accepted maritime exceptions. The first six commonly accepted maritime exceptions 
were developed under English law and have been given effect to in the laws of most maritime 
trading nations, including South Africa.  
These original six exceptions developed under English law include:7 
- Acts of God, 
- Inevitable accidents,  
- Inherent vice of cargo,  
- Latent defect of cargo,  
- Defective packaging of cargo and  
                                                          
5 Hare op cit n 1 at page 619. 
6 Bailment refers to placing personal property into the hands of another party, that party either having temporary 
control or possession, depending on what was agreed by the parties: Ibid. 
7 Ibid at page 620. 
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- Queen’s enemies. 
Freedom of contract is a fundamental principle on which English law of contract is based.8 
Therefore, even though English common law on the one hand, imposed strict liability on ship 
owners who were party to a contract of affreightment under a bill of lading, on the other hand it 
allowed them the freedom to insert clauses into the bill of lading that would substantially limit, or 
even completely exclude their liability. British ship owners dominated the international trade 
markets for a long time. They dictated freight rates and often contracted out of their common law 
obligations to provide a seaworthy vessel. This position of British ship owner supremacy was met 
with hostility by many cargo owning nations that were adversely affected by it. In an effort to 
minimise these adverse effects and to try and achieve a compromise between the rights of cargo 
owners and ship owners, various international attempts were made to create uniform laws that 
would adequately and equitably regulate the carriage of goods by sea.  
Due to the growth of international trade and the need to transport the goods sold internationally, 
the majority of which was transported by sea, there was a need for the unification of the rules 
governing maritime trade activities. This was particularly important to ensure that unified rules 
were in place regulating important aspects of the contract of carriage, such as the result of breach 
of contract by either party.9 This resulted in various maritime conventions being introduced to 
govern different aspects of maritime transactions.10  
2.3 International conventions governing the carrier’s obligation to maintain a seaworthy 
vessel 
In 1882, with the hopes of reaching a compromise between the interests of cargo owners and that 
of ship owners, the Comité Maritime International (the CMI) established by the International Law 
Association prepared a model bill of lading that could be adopted voluntarily by shipping interests. 
It was known as the Liverpool Bill of Lading and included compromises similar to those contained 
in the Harter Act, which came into operation in 1893. However, the International Law 
                                                          
8 ‘Freedom of contract’ means that parties can agree to anything that is possible and lawful: D Hutchison and et al The 
Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed (2012) at page 7. 
9 AH Kassem The Legal Aspects of Seaworthiness: Current Law and Development (unpublished PHD, University of 




Association’s efforts were unsuccessful as final agreement on the Liverpool Bill of Lading was 
never reached.11 
The writer will more fully discuss and scrutinise the reasons behind the enactment of the Harter 
Act and the methods it introduced to try and achieve a balance between the interests of cargo 
owners and ship owners. 
2.4 International conventions governing the carriage of goods by sea and the carrier’s 
obligation to maintain a seaworthy vessel 
2.4.1 The Harter Act  
Until the end of the 19th century, British ship owners still dominated the shipping industry, as the 
bulk of the transatlantic trade was conducted by British shipping. The English courts enforced the 
exclusion of liability clauses contained in contracts of carriage of goods by sea on the basis of 
freedom of contract.12 In the 1870’s, the majority of the US courts declared that clauses which 
sought to unreasonably limit the liability of ship owners were against public policy and therefore 
void.13 Hare points out this position taken by US courts in his discussion of The Liverpool case,14 
where a British ship carried a shipment of cargo from New York to Liverpool. The goods on board 
the vessel were lost due to the negligence of the crew. The bill of lading contained a clause 
exempting the ship owner from the negligence of the master or any other crew members of the 
vessel. The court held that clauses that exempt the carrier from his duty to exercise due diligence 
were against public policy and the ship owner was therefore held liable for the loss of the goods 
due to the negligence of the crew.15 
Legislators in the US subsequently formulated a bill designed to bring an end to carriers 
contracting out of liability.16 The original bill was drafted in favour of cargo interests by imposing 
such obligations as an absolute duty of a carrier to furnish a seaworthy vessel.17 Immediate 
concerns arose regarding the potential of the bill to adversely affect the ability of US ship owners 
                                                          
11 M Sturley ‘The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules’ (1991) 22 THE JOURNAL OF MARITIME LAW & 
COMMERCE 1 at page 6 and 7.  
12 V Rochester The Lone “Carrier” (published LLM dissertation, University of Cape Town, 2005) at page 5. 
13 Hare op cit n 1 at page 622. 
14 Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v Phenix Insurance Co. 129 U.S. 397 (1889). 
15 Hare op cit n 1 at page 622. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Sturley op cit n 11 at page 12.  
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to compete with their English counterparts; this led to several amendments being effected to the 
bill once it reached senate level.18 Senate debates led to the absolute duty to furnish a seaworthy 
ship being reduced to a standard of due diligence. Furthermore, exceptions allowing the carrier to 
escape liability for loss or damage to goods, provided that the vessel was seaworthy, were included 
in the bill.19 The exceptions given effect to in the Harter Act were: 
- the nautical fault exception,  
- perils of the sea,  
- acts of God,  
- public enemies,  
- inherent defects in the goods carried,  
- insufficiency of packaging and  
- deviation for the purpose of saving life or property at sea.20  
The most controversial exception is the nautical fault exception (also referred to as the negligent 
navigation exception), which provides that the carrier escapes accountability for loss or damage of 
the cargo, on the grounds of fault or error in navigation by the master or crew (the writer will 
discuss this exception in greater detail in Chapter 5 of this study). 
The Harter Act was finally passed in the United States in 1893 and is based on the premise that 
any attempt by a carrier to contract out of liability or to reduce its liability beyond the minimum 
standard of due diligence prescribed in the Act, was void and punishable as an offence.21 The 
Harter Act remains in force; however it is now only applicable to the interstate carriage of goods 
and not to foreign carriage contracts.22 The provisions of the Harter Act influenced other nations 
that supported its initiative to hold the ship owner liable to a minimum standard of liability that it 
could not contract out of. Just over a decade after the Harter Act came into operation, comparable 
                                                          
18 Sturley op cit n 11 at page 13. 
19 Hare op cit n 1 at page 622. 
20 Ibid. 




legislation was ratified in a number of countries.23 Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Fiji 
enacted legislation fashioned after the Harter Act.24 The Harter Act was the first piece of legislation 
to influence the international harmonisation of the rules regulating the carriage of goods by sea 
and it created the platform for future carriage conventions.  
2.4.2 The Hague Rules    
In September 1921, the Maritime Law Committee presented a code of rules at a conference in The 
Hague.25 The Hague Rules were subsequently adopted three months later.26 One of the primary 
objectives of these rules was to protect cargo owners from exclusionary clauses used by carriers 
to absolve themselves from any liability for loss or damage to cargo carried in their vessels.27 The 
Hague Rules were not mandatory and the drafters of the rules hoped that ship owners would 
voluntarily adopt the convention in order to create uniformity and an element of fair trade in the 
international carriage of goods by sea.28 Not surprisingly, however, ship owners were unwilling to 
voluntarily give up their stronger bargaining position. This reluctance by ship owners, coupled 
with a rather underwhelming response from the cargo owners, resulted in another conference being 
held at Brussels in 1923. The rules were amended shortly thereafter and is referred to as the Hague 
Rules, 1924.29 This set of rules provided a new bench mark on the minimum obligations imposed 
on parties to a contract of carriage.30 The freedom British ship owners had enjoyed to contract out 
of liability or substantially limit their liability was finally curtailed when the United Kingdom 
enacted the Hague Rules into their domestic legislation. Following the example of the Harter Act, 
the provisions of the Hague Rules  not only favour the interests of the cargo owner, but also 
attempts to favour the ship owner by substantially watering down the “absolute obligation of a 
carrier to provide a seaworthy vessel to that of a minimum duty to exercise due diligence in making 
the vessel seaworthy”.31 Furthermore, the Hague Rules also contain a list of exceptions that the 
                                                          
23 Rochester op cit n 12 at page 8. 
24 Hare op cit n 1 at page 623. 
25 Ibid. 
26 F Berlingieri The Travaux Preparatoires of the Hague Rules and the Hague Visby Rules (1997) Comite Maritime 
International at page 32. 
27 F Wilson Carriage of Goods by Sea 7 ed (2010) at page 174. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924. 
30 Hare op cit n 1 at page 624. 
31 Kassem op cit n 9 at page 4. 
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carrier can rely on, provided that it has exercised due diligence in maintaining a seaworthy vessel. 
The Hague Rules remained the supreme carriage regime for forty four years after its enactment. 
2.4.3 The Hague Visby Rules 
The Hague Rules were amended in 1968 and were adopted by the ‘Brussels Protocol’,32 paving 
the way for the negotiations and signing of the Hague Visby Rules shortly thereafter.33 The Hague 
Visby Rules are a product of the Hague Rules. The UK ratified the Hague Visby Rules, thereby 
enacting the provisions of the Rules into its domestic Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1971.34 
South Africa never ratified the Hague Visby Rules i.e. it is not a member state thereof, however, 
it did incorporate the rules into its domestic Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1986 (hereafter 
referred to as SA COGSA).35 The Hague Rules and the Hague Visby Rules have been widely 
accepted mainly by developed nations which include the United Kingdom, United States of 
America, Hong Kong and Singapore.36  
The Hague Visby Rules retain the minimum standard of liability of a carrier to exercise due 
diligence in making the vessel seaworthy as well as all of the maritime exceptions contained in the 
Hague Rules. Many cargo owning nations perceive the Hague Rules as predominantly favouring 
the ship owning developed countries that are already powerful players in international maritime 
trade and not adequately protecting the interests of cargo owners. The rules were especially 
unpopular among cargo owning nations due to its retention of the controversial negligent 
navigation exception,37 allowing ship owners to escape liability for damage or loss of cargo 
resulting from the negligent actions of their servants or agents “in the navigation or management 
of the vessel”.38 
2.4.4 The Hamburg Rules 
Given that the Hague Rules came into effect nearly a century ago and the Hague Visby Rules came 
into effect over four decades ago, and both have their origins in the US Harter Act which itself 
                                                          
32 Hare op cit n 1 at page 624. 
33 P Sooksripaisarnkit ‘Enhancing of carriers’ liability in the Rotterdam Rules – Too expensive costs for navigational 
safety? (2014) 8 The International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation at page 310. 
34 Wilson op cit n 27 at page 175. 
35 Hare op cit n 1 at page 625. 
36 Sooksripaisarnkit op cit n 33 at page 310.  
37 This maritime exception is also often referred to as the ‘nautical fault exception’. 
38 Sooksripaisarnkit op cit n 33 at page 310. 
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was enacted a hundred and twenty three years ago, is indicative of the fact that the laws regulating 
the international carriage of goods are acutely in need of updating and modernisation in order to 
adequately regulate and cater for the needs of modern maritime trade. 
Cargo owners were of the view that the Hague Rules were unfair as they focused mainly on the 
interests of ship owners.39 Ship owners also became wary of the Hague Rules after the ruling by 
the House of Lords in the case of The Muncaster Castle (this case will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 3);40 where the House of Lords held that the ship owners had not exercised due 
diligence in making the vessel seaworthy due to the goods sustaining water damage as a result of 
the inspection covers of the vessel being improperly fitted by fitters from a reputable firm hired by 
the ship owner.41 The ship owners contested that they had exercised the necessary due diligence 
by hiring professional fitters to inspect the vessel and could not be held liable for the negligence 
of the independent contractors hired to ensure the seaworthiness of the vessel. This argument was 
however rejected by the House of Lords.42 
A new convention was drafted to address the concerns of both ship and cargo owners. In March 
1978, at an international conference held in Hamburg this convention was adopted.43 The Hamburg 
Rules came into effect in November 1992. Only thirty four states have ratified the Hamburg Rules 
and none of these states are considered influential in global maritime trade.44 South Africa has not 
adopted the Hamburg Rules, nor is it likely to do so in the future. The Hamburg Rules however, 
cannot be ignored by South African maritime practitioners and scholars because some of its trading 
partners have acceded to the Convention.45 From an academic and policy making perspective, the 
convention is also worthy of further scrutiny regarding the reasons behind its failure to attract 
wider acceptance from the major maritime trading nations i.e. the United States of America and 
China.46 The main reason for its unpopularity among ship owning nations can be attributed to the 
fact that it shifts liability for loss or damage of cargo squarely on to the shoulders of the carrier.47 
                                                          
39 By the insertion of the limitation of liability article (Article IV). 
40 Riverstone Meat Company, Pty., Ltd v Lancashire Shipping Company Ltd. [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 57. 
41 Hare op cit n 1 at page 626. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Wilson op cit n 27 at page 215.  
44 Ibid. 
45 The major trading partners of South Africa that have acceded to the Convention are Botswana, Nigeria and Zambia.  
46 Hare op cit n 1 at page 625. 
47 Ibid.  
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The Hamburg Rules deviate from its predecessors on the position of the carrier’s obligation to 
provide a seaworthy vessel in a number of ways: 
- the seaworthiness obligation is not dealt with in a separate detailed article; 
- the carrier’s duty to exercise due diligence is extended to the entire duration that the cargo 
is in the custody of the carrier, not just before and at the commencement of the voyage; 
and 
- the carrier’s liability for loss or damage of the cargo is presumed, unless it can prove its 
innocence and there is no list of exemptions allowing the carrier to limit its liability.48 
It is therefore not surprising that predominantly ship owning maritime nations have not adopted 
the Hamburg Rules as it does not operate in favour of the ship owner or carrier. 
2.4.5 The Rotterdam Rules 
The Hague Visby Rules have been the subject of international criticism for decades. The view 
shared by many maritime scholars and practitioners is that the Hague Visby Rules are extremely 
outdated and do not adequately address the needs of modern maritime trade.49 A need for a new 
regime to create a sense of uniformity presented itself (and still presents itself in sea trade), the 
drafting of what is now known as the Rotterdam Rules began in 1996 as a project of both the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the CMI.50 
The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Rotterdam Rules on 11 December 2008. 
At the signing ceremony, which was held on 23 September 2009, due to the presumption of a 
proper balance between the interests of the ship owners and cargo owners being achieved under 
the Rotterdam Rules, there was an expeditious approval of the Rules from a number of nations that 
have become signatories to the Convention (including the United States of America).51 However, 
the Rotterdam Rules will only come into effect as an international convention governing the 
carriage of goods in international maritime trade, one year after it has been officially ratified by a 
minimum of twenty signatory countries.52 This process of ratification has been very slow and six 
                                                          
48 Kassem op cit n 9 at page 4. 
49 Hare op cit n 1 at page 628. 
50 Sooksripaisarnkit op cit n 33 at page 308. 
51 Wilson op cit n 27 at page 231.  
52 Sooksripaisarnkit op cit n 33 at page 308. 
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years after being opened for signature, the Rules have not received the requisite number of 
signatures to allow it to come into operation. Furthermore, the few countries that have formally 
ratified it, are not perceived as states with any significant shipping influence.53 The need for 
uniformity and for a set of modified rules led to the drafting of The Rotterdam Rules. The 
Rotterdam Rules have been described as a carriage regime for the future and its drafters and 
supporters had hoped that it would achieve the success that its predecessor, the Hamburg Rules 
could not achieve.54 
The Rotterdam Rules are unique in that they are a multimodal convention that applies to door-to-
door coverage as opposed to the port-to-port coverage provided by its predecessors.55 Door-to-
door coverage by the Rotterdam Rules are only applicable where the carriage includes a sea leg 
and that sea leg involves cross-border transport.56 The effect of the door-to-door coverage is that 
it extends the duration of the carrier’s responsibility for the cargo from the time of receipt of cargo 
right up to the delivery of the cargo to the consignee.57 It could render the carrier liable for loss, 
damage or delay occurring during the inland carriage of the goods prior to or subsequent to the sea 
leg carriage of the goods.58 Conflict may potentially present itself between other conventions (the 
Hague and Hague Visby Rules) which provide for port-to-port coverage and the Rotterdam Rules 
(door-to-door coverage).59 There are provisions which deal with this potential conflict, which will 
not be discussed in this study as it goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
The drafters of the Rotterdam Rules aimed to increase the liability and responsibility of the carrier. 
With regard to the seaworthiness obligation of the carrier, the Rotterdam Rules introduce two 
fundamental deviations to the approaches stipulated in the Hague Rules and Hague Visby Rules. 
Firstly, the carrier’s obligation to maintain a seaworthy vessel is extended to the duration of the 
entire voyage, and secondly, the Rotterdam Rules have removed the nautical fault exception from 
the list of the carrier’s immunities against liability.  
                                                          
53 Spain, Congo and Togo have ratified the Rotterdam Rules: Sooksripaisarnkit op cit n 33 at page 308. 
54 Hare op cit n 1 at page 630. 
55 Wilson op cit n 27 at page 231.  
56 Article 5 of the Rotterdam Rules. 





2.5  South African Perspective on the Ratification of the Rotterdam Rules 
South Africa has not ratified the Rotterdam Rules.60 Therefore, the current laws governing the 
carriage of goods by sea in South Africa are in line with the Hague Visby Rules incorporated into 
its domestic carriage legislation, specifying that the carrier has an obligation to exercise due 
diligence in maintaining a seaworthy vessel only ‘before and at the beginning of the voyage’ and 
still permitting a carrier in a cargo claim to rely on the negligent navigation exception in order to 
escape liability, provided that the carrier is able to prove that due diligence was exercised in 
maintaining a seaworthy vessel. This position in South Africa may however change, due to a 
recently adopted governmental project calling for the review of certain domestic legislation 
regulating maritime law. 
South Africa was introduced to an innovative project called the ‘Big Fast Result Methodology’ 
during a diplomatic visit to Malaysia in 2013. This project deals with development of certain 
national key priority areas specific to Malaysia and allows the government to achieve significant 
governmental as well as economic transformation within a short time frame. South Africa sought 
to replicate this project and with the support of the Malaysian government, launched the ‘Operation 
Phakisa’ initiative in August 2014.61 The project was initiated with the view of addressing national 
key priority areas specific to South Africa. Its relevance to maritime law can be seen in the series 
of ocean economy initiatives intended to be launched in order to stimulate economic growth and 
job creation within the country. Amongst other initiatives, Operation Phakisa has called for the 
review of ocean related legislation in order to achieve its goals.62  
There are a number of South African statutes that will go under review, the one relevant to this 
study is the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (SA COGSA) that currently incorporates the Hague 
Visby Rules.63 The project highlights the need for the modernisation of the SA COGSA in line 
with modern trends, including, considering the possibility of adopting the Rotterdam Rules and 
incorporating it into domestic legislation, should the Rotterdam Rules gain wider acceptance.64 
                                                          
60 Hare op cit n 1 at page 625. 
61 M Hartwell ‘The changing face of South Africa’s shipping legislation’ (October 2014), Norton Rose Fulbright, 
South Africa, available at http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/122442/the-changing-face-of-
south-africas-shipping-legislation accessed on 05/06/2016. 
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid. 
64 ‘Unlocking the Economic Potential of South Africa’s Oceans’ (August 2014), Marine Protection Services and 
Governance Final Lab Report, available at 
15 
 
The justification for this is based on the need to maintain uniformity with the current applicable 
international carriage regimes “that encourage ship owners to register vessels on the South African 
Registry”.65  
2.6 Conclusion 
The majority of the World’s major trading nations, including South Africa and most of its trading 
partners have either ratified or incorporated some version of the Hague or Hague Visby Rules into 
its domestic laws.66 There have been numerous attempts to update these applicable carriage 
regimes and all these attempts are aimed at creating a balance between the interests of the ship 
owners and cargo owners. The Rotterdam Rules is the latest of this kind of attempt in striking a 
balance between these competing interests. The Rotterdam Rules have thus far failed to achieve 
the widespread acceptance that was hoped for. None of South Africa’s major trading partners 
(China, the US and UK) have ratified the Rotterdam Rules,67 therefore South Africa has adopted 
a wait and see approach with regard to ratifying the Rotterdam Rules and will probably only do so 
if its major trading partners ratify it. This study will scrutinize the feasibility of  adopting the 
Rotterdam Rules from the perspective of the carriers seaworthiness obligation in cargo claims and 
will illustrate that this would be a somewhat detrimental shift from the current provisions 
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3 Chapter 3: Seaworthiness in Context 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 of this study focused on the evolution of the law governing the carriage of goods by sea 
from its historical roots to present day maritime trade. This chapter will consider the nature of 
seaworthiness. The traditional common law definition of seaworthiness (please see the discussion 
of this concept under common law in Chapter 1 of this study) remains important as it is unchanged, 
however the nature of the obligation and the extent to which the carrier would be liable in the event 
of loss or damage of goods resulting from the unseaworthiness of the vessel has subsequently been 
altered.69 Thus, it can be seen that even though it has been illustrated that over time, the common 
law of carriage has been somewhat displaced, it still plays an important role when interpreting 
statutes70 and contracts defining parties contractual rights and duties.71 
Seaworthiness is a broad concept which is difficult to define. The term not only encompasses the 
physical state of the vessel but extends to other factors such as the equipment in the vessel, fitness 
of the crew, documentation necessary for the voyage etc.72 In this chapter, the writer will examine 
this common law definition of seaworthiness, which was later reflected in the Hague Visby Rules 
and imported into the SA COGSA. 
3.2 The definition of seaworthiness under common law 
As illustrated from the discussion on the historical development of the carrier’s obligation in 
Chapter 1; at common law derived from Roman and later English law, the carrier was obliged to 
provide a seaworthy vessel for the purposes of carrying goods by sea.73 The absolute obligation to 
provide a seaworthy vessel was watered down by the ‘due diligence’ provision introduced in the 
Harter Act, and this provision was retained in the Hague Rules and the subsequent Hague Visby 
Rules.74 
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71 Philip Bros v Koop (1885) 4 SC 53.  
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At common law, the carrier is liable to the cargo owner for any loss of cargo resulting from the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel at the commencement of the voyage.75 The vessel must be capable 
of withstanding the perils of the sea and other incidental risks that it may encounter during the 
course of the voyage.76 Seaworthiness is defined as “that degree of fitness which an ordinary 
careful and prudent owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage 
having regard to all the probable circumstances of it.”77 The absolute obligation to provide a 
seaworthy vessel does not mean that the vessel has to be perfect.78 The absolute obligation entails 
that the vessel must be reasonably seaworthy, or be able to be made so by means known to and 
available to a reasonable and careful owner.79 
The ship owner undertakes to provide a vessel that is reasonably fit for the purpose for which it is 
contracted and any ignorance regarding the unseaworthiness of the vessel at the commencement 
of the carriage is no excuse.80 Thus “if the ship is in fact unfit at the time when the warranty begins, 
it does not matter that its unfitness is due to some latent defect which the ship-owner does not 
know of, and it is no excuse for the existence of such a defect that he used his best endeavours to 
make the ship as good as it could be made”.81 
Carver comments on the objective test to determine whether the carrier fulfilled his duty to provide 
a seaworthy vessel or not:  
“Would a prudent owner have required that it (the defect) should be made good before 
sending his ship to sea had he known of it? If he would, the ship was not seaworthy within 
the meaning of the undertaking”.82  
Kassem explains that this test involves taking into account the conduct of a reasonable and careful 
ship owner and the actions he would take were he to become aware of a defect in his vessel.  
“If a prudent ship owner decided that the defect should be repaired before sending the 
vessel to sea, then the vessel would be unseaworthy if she was sent without repairs, but 
                                                          
75 Hare op cit n 1 at page 640. 
76 Kopitoff v Wilson (1876) 1 QBD 377 at 380. 
77 McFadden v Blue Star Line [1905] 1 KB 697 at 706. 
78 Wilson op cit n 27 at page 174. 
79 Blue Star supra n 77. 
80 Ibid.  
81 Ibid. 
82 TG Carver Carriage by Sea 13 ed (1982). 
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if he decided that the defect did not need to be repaired and it would be safe without doing 
so, then she would be seaworthy if sent in such a condition”.83 
In order to determine whether a vessel is seaworthy various circumstances surrounding the loss 
and damage to the goods must be considered e.g. the type of vessel, the route the vessel is going 
to take, the cargo that it is carrying, the season in which the vessel was set to sail and the degree 
of knowledge available at the relevant times.84 The standard of seaworthiness may differ with 
improved knowledge or technology becoming available to the ship owner.85 Provided that the 
vessel is factually seaworthy, it is not necessary for the ship owner to ensure that the vessel is 
equipped with the latest technology and navigational aids.86 A vessel may therefore be seaworthy 
upon sailing, although the vessel, in that condition, is not necessarily fit to complete its voyage.87 
The elements that make up seaworthiness under common law: 
i. Physical seaworthiness of the vessel 
This means that the vessel must be physically fit for the voyage. According to Hare, 
the ship has to be physically seaworthy for the purpose of the entire voyage i.e. sailing 
from the port of loading to the port of unloading.88 
ii. Cargo-worthiness 
This means that the vessel must be suitable for the particular cargo she is required to 
carry.89 Thus, if for instance the vessel is scheduled to carry frozen goods, then the 
carrier will have to ensure that appropriate refrigerating and freezing apparatus are on 
board the vessel. 
iii. The vessel has to properly manned by competent crew 
This means that the crew on board the vessel must be properly trained and competent 
for the envisaged voyage. The carrier has to therefore employ crewmen who fulfil this 
requirement. 
                                                          
83 Kassem op cit n 9 at page 15. 
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It is important to note that, in the event that any one of the abovementioned elements are lacking, 
then the vessel will be deemed to be unseaworthy (the same applies equally to the Hague Visby 
Rules).  
It is not sufficient to assert that the vessel is unseaworthy and cargo is lost or damaged, a causative 
connection between the unseaworthiness of the vessel and the subsequent loss or damage of the 
cargo needs to be established.90 The owner of the cargo that is lost or damaged bears the onus of 
proving that the vessel was unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage and that the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel was the cause of the loss or damage suffered (the burden of proof 
will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 5 of this study).91 Furthermore, it must be proven that 
the loss or damage would not have occurred if the vessel was seaworthy.92 It does not matter that 
the ship owner took all reasonable precautions and steps to prepare his vessel for the impending 
voyage, if the vessel sails in a factually unseaworthy condition and if the condition causes a loss, 
the ship owner is liable.93 
The vessel is required to be seaworthy at the commencement of each stage, if the vessel is to 
engage in a voyage in series.94 Where a ship is lost at sea immediately upon embarking on a 
voyage, there is a presumption that operates in favour of the cargo claimant against the ship owner. 
Thus, in the absence of a reasonable explanation as to loss, the courts will presume 
unseaworthiness at the commencement of the voyage.95 
At common law, the undertaking of seaworthiness is regarded as a “warranty”, the breach of such 
warranty would not entitle the cargo owner to resile from the contract, and instead it would give 
rise to damages.96 
In 1893, the Harter Act was introduced in the United States of America and it contained no 
alterations to the common law definition of seaworthiness. There was however a change in the 
nature of the obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel.  
                                                          
90 Per Lord Esher MR in Baumwoll v Gilchrist [1893] 1 QB 253. 
91 The Europa [1904 – 7] All ER Rep 394. 
92 Ibid.  
93 Steel v State Line SS Co [1877] 3 AC 72 (HL). 
94 The Vortigern [1899] P 140. 
95 Levy v Calf & Others [1857] Watermeyer 1 at 4. 
96 Hare op cit n 1 at page 641. 
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“That it shall not be lawful for any vessel transporting merchandise or property from or 
between the ports of the United States of America and foreign ports, her owner, master, 
agent, or manager, to insert in any bill of lading or shipping document any covenant or 
agreement whereby the obligations of the owner or owners of the said vessel to exercise 
due diligence to properly equip, man, provision, and outfit said vessel, and to make said 
vessel seaworthy and capable of performing her intended voyage ... shall in anywise be 
lessened, weakened, or avoided”.97 
The rationale behind the introduction of the Harter Act was to put an end to the insertion of clauses 
which exempt carriers from liability for loss or damage to the cargo in bills of lading. The absolute 
obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel was watered down to the minimum exercise of due 
diligence under the Harter Act. It was a minimum requirement that the carrier would exercise due 
diligence in making the vessel sea and cargo worthy and this minimum standard could not be 
contracted out of.98 The Act was the first step towards placing a minimum standard of obligation 
on the carrier to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy.99 
“If the owner of any vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from any port in 
the United State of America shall exercise due diligence to make the said vessel in all 
respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped, and supplied, neither the vessel, her 
owner or owners, agent, or charterers, shall become or be held responsible for damage or 
loss resulting from faults or errors in navigation or in the management of said vessel”.100 
The exercise of due diligence is a defence to the carrier where cargo has suffered loss or damage. 
Section 3 of the Harter Act introduced what is now known as the “error in navigation exception” 
(which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5). Where cargo is damaged or lost, the Harter Act 
introduced exceptions which the carrier could rely on, provided that the carrier has exercised due 
diligence.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Harter Act sought to balance the interests of the cargo owner and 
those of the ship owner. Although the carrier had an absolute obligation to provide a seaworthy 
vessel under common law, the Harter Act was the first step in increasing the carrier’s liability by 
holding it to a minimum standard that it could not contract out of. The Harter Act prevented any 
attempt by the carrier to exempt or reduce his responsibility of exercising due diligence to provide 
a seaworthy vessel.101 As mentioned above, the traditional definition of seaworthiness was not 
                                                          
97 Section 2 of the Harter Act, 1893. 
98 Kassem op cit n 9 at page 16. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Section 3 of the Harter Act, 1893. 
101 Hare op cit n 1 at page 623. 
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altered by the Harter Act. The exceptions contained in the Harter Act were retained in the Hague 
and subsequent Hague Visby Rules, it is therefore evident that these Rules are modelled after the 
Harter Act. The writer will in the next section discuss seaworthiness in the context of the Hague 
Visby Rules.  
3.3 Seaworthiness under Article III of the Hague Visby Rules 
The Hague Visby Rules define seaworthiness in Article III Rule 1 by providing what factors 
constitute seaworthiness. 
“1. The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due 
diligence to: 
(a) Make the ship seaworthy; 
(b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship; 
(c) Make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in 
which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation.” 
Having set out the relevant provision, the writer will elaborate on the fundamental terminology as 
expressly provided in the abovementioned Rules. 
3.3.1 Who is the carrier? 
Article I of the Hague Visby Rules defines the carrier as: 
“(a) 'Carrier' includes the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage 
with a shipper.” 
The term “carrier” does not have a precise definition under any of the Rules. It is however 
expressed in the Hague and Hague Visby Rules and implied in the Hamburg Rules, that a carrier 
is an owner or charterer. Such persons are only entitled to limit their liability to the extent that the 
claims arise under a contract of carriage (charterparties are not contracts of carriage for this 
purpose, unless a paramount clause is inserted in the charterparty extending the applicability of the 
Rules to the agreement). 
The Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976, states that owners and 
charterers acting as ship owners are persons entitled to limit liability. However charterers who are 
not acting as ship owners are also entitled to limit their liability. Under the Hague, Hague Visby 
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and Hamburg Rules, the definition of carrier is wide enough to include carriers who are not owners 
or charterers, thus freight forwarders may be entitled to limit their liability. 
With regard to servants and agents of a carrier under the Hague Rules, persons other than the 
carrier cannot limit their liability under the Rules. However, a Himalaya clause102 can be inserted 
in the bill of lading to protect servants or agents of the carrier. If the bill of lading is subject to 
English law, then they have a statutory right to rely on clauses in the bill intended to allow them 
to limit their liability. 
Under the Hague Visby Rules (Article IV bis, Rule 2), a servant or agent of the carrier can limit 
his liability in the same way and to the extent that the carrier can, however, that servant or agent 
is not an independent contractor. Independent contractors,103 may rely on the insertion of a 
Himalaya Clause or rely on statutory rights (mentioned above). It is therefore submitted that a 
wide interpretation is attached to the term ‘carrier’. 
3.3.2 The duration of the seaworthiness obligation 
Article III Rule 1 of the Hague Visby Rules: 
“1. The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage” 
In the case of The Makedonia,104 the cargo owners alleged that the vessel was unseaworthy due to 
insufficient bunkers (fuel). The wording of the judgment illustrates that the ship owner’s obligation 
is to exercise due diligence in arranging bunkers at the commencement of the voyage and not at 
every stage of the bunkering operations, unlike the common law position where the doctrine of 
stages is applied. 
In the case of Maxine Footwear,105 upon loading the cargo on board the vessel, it was discovered 
that the ship’s pipes were blocked with ice. The Master ordered members of the crew to use an 
acetylene torch to melt the ice and due to the negligence of crew members, the ship caught fire and 
the cargo was destroyed. The Privy Council explained the phrase ‘before and at the beginning of 
                                                          
102 A Himalaya clause is a provision inserted into contracts that exempt third parties who are not party to the contract 
from liability benefit e.g. stevedores. This term comes from the case of The Himalaya: Adler v Dickson [1954] 2 
Lloyds Rep 267.  
103 These types of clauses are usually intended to cover stevedores.  
104 The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep 316. 
105 Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd. [1999] AC 589. 
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the voyage’ to mean ‘the period from at least the beginning of the loading until the vessel starts on 
her voyage.’106 It was further held that the use of the words ‘at least the beginning’ provides a 
minimum duration of the carrier’s obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel.   
The decision of the Privy Council in the Maxine Footwear case is the authority on the duration of 
the obligation to exercise due diligence in maintaining a seaworthy vessel under the Hague Visby 
Rules. 
3.3.3 The concept of due diligence 
The concept of due diligence was introduced by the Harter Act in 1893 and subsequently adopted 
into the Hague, Hague Visby and Hamburg Rules. None of the conventions define what is meant 
by exercising ‘due diligence’.  
Hare describes due diligence as a ‘first base’ requirement of the carrier.107 He reasoned that the 
carrier will not be able to rely on one of the exceptions listed in Article IV of the Hague Visby 
Rules, unless he is able to prove that there was no connection between the unseaworthiness of the 
vessel and his obligation to exercise due diligence.108 
The standard of due diligence was explained in The Papera case,109 that involved a car carrier that 
was destroyed by fire on board the vessel. The cargo claimants alleged that loss was suffered due 
to the unseaworthiness of the vessel. Cresswell J, explained that the standard of due diligence is 
equivalent to the exercise of reasonable care and skill. He further stated that professional 
negligence amounts to a failure of the carrier to exercise due diligence and the issue in this case 
was whether there was an error of judgment amounting to professional negligence. It was held in 
The Papera case that the standard of due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel is ‘non-
delegable’.  
In The Muncaster Castle case,110 sea water entered the cargo hold and cargo was damaged. It was 
later found that sea water entered due to the negligence of the fitter. The court however emphasised 
                                                          
106 Maxine op cit n 105. 
107 Hare op cit n 1 at page 657. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Papera Traders Co Ltd and Others v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd and Another [2002] EWHC 118 (Comm). 
110 Riverstone op cit n 40. 
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the point made in The Papera case that the standard of due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel 
is non-delegable and subsequently held that the ship owner failed to exercise due diligence. 
“Due diligence means that the carrier must take all reasonable measures that could possibly be 
taken by him, or his servants or agents, to man, equip and make the ship in all respects fit to 
undertake the agreed voyage”.111 
From the above definitions, it is evident that the concept of due diligence requires the carrier to act 
reasonably i.e. the carrier has the obligation to exercise reasonable care.112 Furthermore, the 
obligation to exercise due diligence is the obligation of the carrier and none other than the carrier.  
A test was formulated to determine whether the carrier exercised due diligence, it is an objective 
test which refers to the conduct of a reasonably prudent carrier at the time of exercising due 
diligence.113 Being that the test is objective the standard may differ based on the merits of the case 
and the surrounding circumstances. 
“Due diligence can be defined as: the efforts of the prudent carrier to take all reasonable 
measures that can be possibly taken, in the light of available knowledge and means at the 
relevant time, to fulfil his obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel.”114 
In light of this definition, due diligence refers to the conduct of the carrier alone in ensuring that 
the vessel is seaworthy by taking the requisite reasonable steps in light of the surrounding 
circumstances.115 
The concept of due diligence was discussed in the recent South African case of Viking Inshore 
Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd.116 The difference between the cases 
mentioned above and the case that follows is that the latter deals with the concept of seaworthiness 
from an insurance perspective. In this case, a fishing trawler had capsized and sank soon after it 
collided with a bulk carrier, fourteen lives were lost as a result of this tragedy. Lengthy court 
proceedings arose following the tragedy as well as litigation between the owner of the fishing 
                                                          
111 Kassem op cit n 9 at page 76. 
112 Viking Inshore Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd (41/2015) [2016] ZASCA 21 (18 March 
2016) available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2016/21.html accessed on 03/06/2016. 
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trawler (the insured) and its hull underwriters (the insurer). Such litigation arose from the 
repudiating of the claim for the loss of the fishing trawler. The court of first instance, the Western 
Cape High Court, found in favour of the insurers. The case went on appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal (SCA) and two fundamental issues were raised. The writer will however, only discuss 
the issue that is relevant to this study i.e. whether the loss of the fishing trawler resulted from the 
failure of the insured to exercise due diligence in maintaining a seaworthy vessel.  
It was found that the obligation on the carrier to exercise due diligence by equipping the vessel to 
safely carry cargo, is a positive obligation and is not necessarily the same thing as showing that 
the loss or damage to the insured vessel was caused by a want of due diligence. It was however 
submitted that, just as the carrier has to show the exercise of reasonable care, a failure to exercise 
reasonable care by the insured, that is causally connected to the loss will operate to exclude the 
insurer’s liability. Furthermore it was found that the need to prove the exercise of due diligence 
only arises once the insurer has discharged evidence that the cause of the loss or damage was a 
want of due diligence. The court asserted that this ‘want of due diligence must be established’ on 
the part of the, insured, owner or manager. It was held that this does not depend on the conduct of 
the crewmen instead the focus is on the conduct of those who are responsible for the vessel at a 
more superior placement of management in the company. The Court held that the evidence proved 
that the vessel was properly crewed by the appellant and on that ground the SCA overturned the 
High Court’s decision.     
It is submitted that the finding of the SCA in the abovementioned case is similar to the finding in 
the Papera case i.e. the duty to exercise due diligence is non delegable. Furthermore, where a vessel 
is not properly crewed the vessel will be found to be unseaworthy. 
3.4 Seaworthiness under Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules 
Article 14 
Specific obligations applicable to the voyage by sea 
“The carrier is bound before, at the beginning of, and during the voyage by sea to exercise 
due diligence to: 
(a) Make and keep the ship seaworthy; 
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(b) Properly crew, equip and supply the ship and keep the ship so crewed, equipped and 
supplied throughout the voyage; and 
(c) Make and keep the holds and all other parts of the ship in which the goods are carried, 
and any containers supplied by the carrier in or upon which the goods are carried, fit and 
safe for their reception, carriage and preservation.” 
Having set out the relevant provision under the Rotterdam Rules it is evident that the only aspect 
that has been expressly amended (in comparison to the provision in the Hague Visby Rules), is the 
duration of the carrier’s obligation to exercise due diligence in maintaining a seaworthy vessel. 
The writer will, in the section below elaborate on this express extension. 
3.4.1 The duration of the seaworthiness obligation under the Rotterdam Rules 
The Rotterdam Rules is a recently drafted international convention taking into account the realities 
of modern day transportation of cargo.117 The Hague Visby Rules, on the other hand is an older 
convention which was derived from the Harter Act, 1893, thus these Rules do not take modern 
transportation systems into account.  
At first glance, it would seem that the Rotterdam Rules increase the period in which the carrier is 
obliged to provide a seaworthy vessel. The Rotterdam Rules make the carrier responsible for any 
loss or damaged incurred due to the carrier’s failure to exercise due diligence in maintaining a 
seaworthy vessel throughout the voyage. This deemed extension of the carrier’s obligation to 
maintain a seaworthy vessel impacts on the allocation of risks in sea carriage contracts between 
the ship owner and cargo owner.118 The Rotterdam Rules emphasise the extension of such 
obligation by adding the word ‘keep’ into the description of seaworthiness in Article 14.119 
3.5 Conclusion 
Prior to examining the seaworthiness and safety standards set out in the ISM and ISPS Code, the 
provisions in the Rotterdam Rules extending the carrier’s liability throughout the voyage appears 
to be a novel concept of much significance.120 The question therefore is, whether this extension of 
                                                          
117 Sooksripaisarnkit op cit n 33 at page 309. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Article 14(a) of the Rotterdam Rules. 
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the duration of the obligation to exercise due diligence in maintaining a seaworthy vessel 
throughout the voyage, will have any impact on the carrier’s current obligation. This will be 























4 Chapter 4: The ISM and ISPS Codes 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The ISM Code, was produced to enhance the safety of navigation and environmental protection. 
The ISM Code was incorporated into the SOLAS Convention under Chapter IX. This code is 
mandatorily applicable to all ships carrying flags of SOLAS member states.121 The ISPS Code, 
was created to elevate the security of vessels as well as the port facilities. The ISPS Code applies 
to those states that are party to the SOLAS Convention. In this chapter the writer will discuss both 
codes in relation to the obligation of the carrier to provide a seaworthy vessel. 
4.2 The origin of the ISM and ISPS Codes 
4.2.1 The origin of the ISM Code 
In the late twentieth century there was an increase in maritime accidents, which resulted in loss of 
life, vessels’ and cargo. These incidents include the MS Herald of Free Enterprise (1987),122 MS 
Scandinavian Star (1990)123 and MS Estonia (1994),124 which were all high profile incidents that 
attracted global attention. The maritime industry was consequently under immense pressure to 
alleviate the losses aforementioned, because these accidents “could lead to a boost in litigations, 
insurance claims and premiums and, eventually, freight rates.”125 In an effort to find a solution, 
extensive research was embarked on, which was funded either by governments or NGO’s. 
Research revealed that the majority of these accidents were due to human error, thus in order to 
minimise accidents of a maritime nature it was imperative to introduce safety measures and 
systems to reduce risks of human error.   
Following the aftermath of the MS Herald of Free Enterprise, representatives of the United 
Kingdom requested the International Maritime Organization (the IMO) to promptly investigate 
measures to ensure safer operations of roll-on roll-off ferries.126 The request was accepted at the 
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15th session of the IMO in November 1987. The Organisation's Secretary-General suggested that, 
broad guidelines be developed by the IMO to be utilised by officers and crew members’ onboard 
the vessel in the management of safety and pollution prevention measures.127 The Secretary-
General informed the Assembly that clear and well-known shipboard operating procedures 
together with periodic spontaneous inspections were needed to ensure compliance.128 The 
Assembly accepted this through resolution A.596(15) which was titled "Safety of Passenger Ro-
Ro Ferries". The IMO's Maritime Safety Committee was instructed by the Resolution to create 
guidelines regarding the management of roll-on and roll-off ferries.129 Measures were put forward 
by the United Kingdom to enhance the safety of roll-on roll-off ferries, among these measures was 
the provision of supplementary emergency lighting.130 These measures were unanimously adopted 
by delegates of countries who attended the April 1988 meeting of the IMO’s Maritime Safety 
Committee.131 
At the IMOs 16th session held in October, 1989, the Assembly adopted Resolution A.647(16) 
which contained the first IMO "Guidelines on Management for the Safe Operation of Ships and 
for Pollution Prevention".132 Unlike the 1987 resolution, Resolution A.647(16) applied to all ships. 
Resolution A.647 (16) recognised the importance of having the guidelines reviewed and revised 
on a periodic basis.133 
At the 17th session held in November, 1991, the Assembly adopted the IMO's revised guidelines 
through Resolution A.680 (17).134 This process of reviewing and revising continued until the 18th 
session of the IMO Assembly in 1993. In November, 1993, Resolution A. 741(18) was adopted by 
the Assembly which constitutes the ISM Code.135 The ISM Code was adopted as a 
recommendation, however, due to the potential positive impact of the Code in enhancing safety 
and prevention of pollution and the general ineffectiveness of the Code's voluntary predecessors, 
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the Code was made mandatory by the incorporation of it as a new SOLAS Chapter IX: 
“Management for the Safe Operation of Ships” on 19 May 1994 by the IMO Assembly. It is stated 
in SOLAS that the company and vessel shall comply with the requirements of the ISM Code.136 
The ISM Code was produced to provide a framework for companies to establish integrated Safety 
Management Systems (SMS) to reduce accidents caused by human error.137 
Thus the ISM Code was created by the IMO as a direct response to the accidents and claims arising 
from the various maritime incidents described above.138 
The primary reason for incorporating the ISM Code into the SOLAS Convention, as opposed to 
retaining it as a stand-alone convention is that, more than 96% of the world tonnage countries are 
SOLAS member states, making the ISM Code mandatorily applicable to all contracting states 
unless an express reservation excluding the application of the code was made by a contracting 
state.139 Thus, the incorporation of the ISM Code into the SOLAS Convention is a means to ensure 
the efficient and widespread application of the Code, ensuring that all contracting states of the 
SOLAS Convention abide by the safety measures set out in it. 
4.2.2 The origin of the ISPS Code 
Terrorism is another crime that occurs at sea (other than piracy and armed robberies). Thus it 
became necessary in the twentieth century to create a legal framework to reduce and eventually 
overcome acts of terrorism at sea. The trigger incident for the creation of the ISPS Code was that 
of the Achille Lauro in 1985 where a cruise ship was hijacked in an attempt to coerce the release 
of fifty Palestinians in Israel.140 In 1986, the United Nations General Assembly briefed the IMO 
to draft a convention that dealt with unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation. It 
should be noted that the existing provisions relating to piracy could not be applied accordingly, as 
piracy has specific elements,141 which do not exist in relation to terrorism.  
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The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime Navigation (the 
Convention) was adopted in Rome in 1988 and came into force in 1992. The Convention creates 
a list of offences and provides for the compliance and enforcement by contracting parties. In 2005, 
a protocol was added to the Convention. Article 3 (bis) was inserted, which criminalised 
intentional transport of biological, chemical and nuclear (BCN) weapons and equipment.142 
In December 2002 – in direct response to the infamous 9/11 attacks in 2001, work was undertaken 
by the IMO which led to the adoption of amendments of the SOLAS Convention and the ISPS 
Code.143 Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention read together with the ISPS Code provide a 
number of mandatory measures aimed at increasing the security of vessels’ engaged in global 
voyages and port facilities serving them. It addresses all realms of security and are not limited to 
decreasing acts of terrorism. The code has both a mandatory and a recommendatory part and the 
reasons for its incorporation into the SOLAS Convention are the same reasons for the 
incorporation of the ISM Code into the SOLAS Convention. 
4.3 The objectives of the ISM and ISPS Codes in relations to the carrier’s obligation to 
provide a seaworthy vessel 
4.3.1 The objectives of the ISM Code 
The ISM Code is an innovative regime in that it creates increased safety management standards 
for ship owners and operators which no other regime successfully does. It aims to identify and 
hold ship owners accountable for maritime accidents that may occur.144 
The objective of the ISM Code is described in its preamble i.e. “the purpose of this Code is to 
provide an international standard for the safe management and operation of ships and for pollution 
prevention”.145 To give substance to what is stated in the preamble, the aim of the ISM Code is to 
prevent the occurrence of maritime accidents due to human error, which as mentioned above is the 
cause of many maritime accidents. Thus correct application of the ISM Code would lead to the 
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eradication of the occurrence of maritime accidents due to human error.146 This consequently raises 
the international shipping standards and safety at sea as well as prevention of sea pollution.147 
The ISM Code states that: 
“The objectives of the Code are to ensure safety at sea, prevention of human injury or 
loss of life, and avoidance of damage to the environment, in particular, to the marine 
environment, and to property.  
1.2.2 Safety management objectives of the Company should, inter alia:  
1. provide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working environment;  
2. establish safeguards against all identified risks; and  
3. continuously improve safety management skills of personnel ashore and aboard ships, 
including preparing for emergencies related both to safety and environmental protection.  
1.2.3 The safety and management system should ensure:  
1. compliance with mandatory rules and regulations; and  
2. that applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization, 
Administrations, classification societies and maritime industry organizations are 
taken.”148 
From the wording of section 1.2 of the ISM Code, it would seem that the objective of the code is 
to make certain that ship owners’ develop and utilise their own safety management system (in 
addition to the generalised ship safety requirements that have to be complied with by all ship 
owners’).149 By coercing ship owners’ to create additional safety management standards, the ISM 
Code attempts to increase the safety of ships and reduce maritime accidents, ultimately preventing 
the loss of life, vessels and cargo.  
Lord Donaldson sums up the objective of the ISM Code as follows: 
 “in the short and medium term it is designated to discover and eliminate sub-standard 
ships, together with sub-standard owners and managers, not to mention many others who 
contribute to their survival and, in some cases, prosperity. In the longer term its 
destination is to discover new and improved methods of ship operation, management and 
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regulation which will produce a safety record more akin to that of the aviation industry. 
But as I readily admit, that is very much for the future”.150  
A substandard ship is one whose “hull, machinery, equipment or operational safety is substantially 
below the standards required by the relevant convention or whose crew is not in conformance with 
the safe manning document”.151 This means that the immediate aim of the ISM Code is to clear 
the shipping industry of non-compliant vessels and crewmen. Furthermore, the Code 
acknowledges that drastic changes cannot occur over night, thus its aim is to gradually create and 
implement improved means of achieving safer shipping operations. 
4.3.2 The objective of the ISPS Code 
The objective of the ISPS Code is to identify security threats and implement appropriate security 
measures to deter from such threat. The purpose of the ISPS Code is to found an international 
framework which will be based on the co-operation of the different international bodies, to 
establish security measures to deter a security breach that may occur against a vessel or port 
facility. Furthermore, the ISPS Code aims to establish the obligations of each party for maritime 
security enhancement. In addition, the code aims to establish and implement procedures to 
efficiently circulate information regarding security, develop methods to identify security threats or 
breaches and ultimately to ensure that appropriate as well as efficient security measures are put 
into place. 
In a nutshell the ISPS Code aims to ensure proper security measures for all vessels and port 
facilities in order to eradicate any security threat or breach which might ultimately result in the 
loss of life, vessels’ or cargo. The ISPS Code attempts to do this by creating appropriate security 
measures to deal with such security breaches. 
4.4 The relevance of the ISM and ISPS Code in relation to the carrier’s obligation to 
provide a seaworthy vessel. 
4.4.1 The ISM Code in relation to the carrier’s obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel 
The ISM Code is incorporated into the SOLAS Convention as opposed to the Hague or Hague 
Visby Rules, so it could be incorrectly assumed that the Code has no significance in relation to the 
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topic of seaworthiness. However, the objectives for incorporating the ISM Code into the SOLAS 
Convention discussed above, clearly indicate that the Code does in fact deal with the seaworthiness 
of vessels carrying the flags of SOLAS member states. Furthermore there is a correlation between 
all international maritime conventions whether directly or indirectly.  
As mentioned above, the ISM Code sets out minimum safety standards that aim to decrease and 
eventually eliminate human errors that result in maritime accidents. These minimum safety 
standards set out in the Code extend the carrier’s obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel.152 In 
the Eurasian Dream case, it was held that “the ISM Code, is a framework upon which good 
practices should be hung.”153 Thus it would be good practice for a prudent carrier to follow the 
ISM Code when fulfilling the obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel. This point should be 
followed by the fact that the ISM Code contains current good practice standards to be followed by 
‘prudent ship owners’ (ensuring that the vessel is regularly maintained, up to date charts are kept 
on board the vessel etc.), emphasising good practice in the shipping world and ensuring that all the 
companies and ship owners of member states abide by it.154 The ISM Code does not set out 
requirements that are difficult to follow, instead it contains requirements that are already carried 
out by prudent ship owners. 
There are two section of the ISM Code that are relevant to the consideration of the seaworthiness 
of a vessel:  
“6. RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL  
6.1 The Company should ensure that the master is:  
.1 properly qualified for command;  
.2 fully conversant with the Company's SMS; and  
.3 given the necessary support so that the master's duties can be safely performed.  
6.2 The Company should ensure that each ship is:  
.1 manned with qualified, certificated and medically fit seafarers in accordance with 
national and international requirements; and  
.2 appropriately manned in order to encompass all aspects of maintaining safe operation 
on board.  
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6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel 
transferred to new assignments related to safety and protection of the environment are 
given proper familiarization with their duties. Instructions which are essential to be 
provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.  
6.4 The Company should ensure that all personnel involved in the Company's SMS have 
an adequate understanding of relevant rules, regulations, codes and guidelines.  
6.5 The Company should establish and maintain procedures for identifying any training 
which may be required in support of the SMS and ensure that such training is provided 
for all personnel concerned.  
6.6 The Company should establish procedures by which the ship's personnel receive 
relevant information on the SMS in a working language or languages understood by them.  
6.7 The Company should ensure that the ship's personnel are able to communicate 
effectively in the execution of their duties related to the SMS.”155  
The abbreviation referred to as ‘SMS’ in the ISM Code means Safety Management 
System. 
“10. MAINTENANCE OF THE SHIP AND EQUIPMENT  
10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in 
conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any 
additional requirements which may be established by the Company.  
10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:  
.1 inspections are held at appropriate intervals;  
.2 any non-conformity is reported, with its possible cause, if known;  
.3 appropriate corrective action is taken; and  
.4 records of these activities are maintained.  
10.3 The Company should identify equipment and technical systems the sudden 
operational failure of which may result in hazardous situations. The SMS should provide 
for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of such equipment or systems. 
These measures should include the regular testing of stand-by arrangements and 
equipment or technical systems that are not in continuous use.  
10.4 The inspections mentioned in 10.2 as well as the measures referred to in 10.3 should 
be integrated into the ship's operational maintenance routine.”156  
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The ISM Code is a fairly new framework containing modern regulations regarding the safety of 
ships unlike the Hague Visby Rules, which were created in 1963 (not long after World War II) and 
contain rules regarding seaworthiness that had not been amended since 1924 (the Hague Rules).  
As mentioned above, the obligation to maintain a seaworthy vessel was limited to ‘before and at 
the beginning of the voyage’ under the Hague Rules in 1924. The rationale for this limited duration 
was due to the restricted methods of communication that existed in that era that did not permit ship 
to shore communication. Difficulties arose when a vessel was out at sea and information could not 
be quickly efficiently sent to relevant persons on shore.157 This has since changed. The advent of 
modern technology and satellite systems has brought about multiple methods of communication, 
keeping crewmen, masters and ship owners as well as their personnel on shore in constant 
communication. The effect of this is that any defect affecting the seaworthiness of the vessel that 
occurs during the voyage may be identified and expediently rectified at the nearest port. 
Furthermore, ship owners may-if they deem necessary, enroll their crewmen at training institutions 
that are created to ensure the competence of crewmen.  
The ISM Code has been in existence for over a decade, so ship owners should be acquainted with 
the requirements of the Code. Nikaki notes that while the Rotterdam Rules do not create an 
extended obligation on ship owners to maintain a seaworthy vessel,158 ship owners will not find 
themselves incurring additional costs in complying with the extended seaworthiness obligation 
under the Rotterdam Rules as most of them are already complying with such obligations under the 
ISM Code. 
Compliance with the ISM Code creates a presumption that due diligence in providing a seaworthy 
vessel is exercised by the ship owners. On the other hand failure of compliance with the ISM Code 
creates a presumption of not exercising due diligence.159 The ISM Code (which is in keeping with 
good shipping practice) results in the extension of the obligation of the ship owner to provide a 
seaworthy vessel throughout the voyage. This extension arises from the fact that the ISM Code is 
a fairly modern regime that takes into account modern technology, which was lacking in the past, 
limiting the duration of the obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel. Thus by following the 
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requirements in the ISM Code ship owners are complying with their obligation to exercise due 
diligence. It is for this reason that many scholars such as; Jose Alcantara, Nikaki Theodora and 
Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit (to name a few) are of the opinion that the Rotterdam Rules do not 
increase the duration of the obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel. The Rotterdam Rules do not 
introduce anything novel in this respect, they merely bring private law obligations of the carrier in 
line with its public law obligations (the ISM Code). 
4.4.2 The ISPS Code in relation to the carrier’s obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel 
As a way of introduction it should be noted that unlike the ISM Code, the ISPS Code does not deal 
with the maintenance of the vessel, training of the crew and crew competence or machinery 
(physical aspects of the seaworthiness of the vessel).  
The ISPS Code deals with the training of certain crew members responsible for specific security 
duties in relation to navigational operations of the ship and emergencies that may arise on board 
the vessel, impacting on the seaworthiness of the vessel e.g. firefighting skills. It however, does 
not address crew members’ duties relating to the updating of vessel documents e.g. charts, manual 
etc.160 The ISPS Code prescribes security duties that Security Officers and other crew members 
must comply with on board the vessel.161 Such officials will have to undergo specific training 
which is detailed within the Code. Additionally, the ISPS Code prescribes that the carrier is to 
provide the vessel with adequate security equipment e.g. fence, lights etc.162  Furthermore, the 
ISPS Code obliges the carrier to keep certain records regarding changes in levels of security, 
breaches of security, ship security plan etc.163 If the carrier complies with the requirements set out 
in the ISPS Code, it will be awarded a compliance certificate by the administrator, and these 
certificates must be kept on board.164 This has an impact on the seaworthiness of the vessel; the 
rationale is that the ISPS Code requires that the vessel has to comply with its requirements to 
obtain certain certificates. In the event that the vessel does not comply this will result in 
invalidation of the certificates issued under the Code. Such invalidation may result in the authority 
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at the port of destination preventing the ship from entering, from loading/unloading or leaving the 
port.165 
According to the ISPS Code, the vessel has the obligation of carrying all the documents required 
by the law and regulation of its flag state, those required by the country that the vessel is visiting, 
or the local administration of that country.166 Where a vessel does not possess documents required 
by the ISM or ISPS Code, the vessel will be found to be unseaworthy for the aforementioned 
reasons.167 However where a vessel does not possess certain documents but can get possession of 
them quickly (without delay), the vessel will not be found unseaworthy.168 
Consequently, the ISPS Code requires that the carrier carries valid compliance certificates at all 
times during the voyage (not limited to ‘before and at the beginning of the voyage’). Even though 
the Hague and Hague Visby Rules only require the carrier to maintain a seaworthy vessel ‘before 
and at the beginning of the voyage’, the ISPS Code requires the carrier to have valid documents 
and certificates ensuring seaworthiness of the vessel at the beginning as well as during the voyage, 
which is in line with the seaworthiness requirements contained in the Rotterdam Rules. 
4.5 Conclusion 
It is therefore submitted that the extension of the carrier’s liability to provide a seaworthy vessel 
throughout the voyage and not just at the beginning and commencement of the voyage is not a 
novel concept. This extension provided for in the Rotterdam Rules is merely giving effect to 
compliance standards ensuring seaworthiness of the vessel that carriers in most SOLAS nations 
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5 Chapter 5: Limitation of the Carrier’s Liability 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The Hague Visby and Rotterdam Rules contain a list of exceptions which exempt the carrier from 
liability in the event of loss or damage to the cargo provided that the vessel was seaworthy at the 
relevant times. In this chapter, the writer provides a brief overview on the burden of proof in cargo 
claims and an in-depth examination of some of the commonly invoked exceptions contained in the 
Hague Visby Rules. The primary focus will however be on the controversial negligent navigation 
exception that the carrier may rely on in a cargo claim. Furthermore, the writer will examine the 
rationale for the abolition of the negligent navigation exception in the Rotterdam Rules which, 
critics of the Rules claim to be “the only saving grace” of the Rotterdam Rules.169 
5.2 Burden of proof 
5.2.1 Burden of proof under common law  
When determining who bears the burden of proof in cargo claims, the court must take heed of the 
maxim of “he who asserts must prove”.170 At common law, the cargo owner must prove the loss 
and the cause of the loss; the carrier may then prove that there is a limitation or immunity that is 
plausible under the contract or statute and that it is categorised as a defence to a cargo claim.171 At 
common law, exception clauses were narrowly and strictly interpreted either for or against the 
carrier i.e. there was no grey area.172 
5.2.2 Burden of proof under the relevant carriage regimes 
At first glance (with the exception of the extension of the period of liability of the carrier), the 
Rotterdam Rules appear to prescribe an order of proof in cargo claims similar to that provided for 
in the Hague Visby Rules.173 
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i. Burden of proof under the Hague Visby Rules 
Article IV Rule 1 of the Hague Visby Rules states that: 
“Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or resulting 
from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on the part of the carrier to 
make the ship seaworthy, and to secure that the ship is properly manned, equipped and 
supplied, and to make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers and all other parts of the 
ship in which goods are carried fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation 
in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article III. Whenever loss or damage 
has resulted from unseaworthiness the burden of proving the exercise of due diligence 
shall be on the carrier or other person claiming exemption under this article”. 
Under the Hague Visby Rules, which is incorporated into the South African Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act, in a cargo claim the onus of proof shifts from the cargo owner to the carrier and vice 
versa. According to Hare, exceptions and limitations are raised by the carrier as ‘substantive 
defences’ in the carrier’s plea to a cargo claim.174 
To illustrate the effect of the shifting of the burden of proof, the writer will explain how this is 
done in practice. Under both the Hague Visby and Rotterdam Rules, the initial burden of proof 
(prima facie case) falls on the cargo claimant who has to establish that the loss or damage of the 
cargo took place during the period of the carrier's liability.175 Once this is established, the carrier's 
liability is presumed and the burden of proof then shifts to the carrier. 
Once the cargo claimant establishes the abovementioned prima facie case, the carrier must prove: 
“i) the cause of the loss;  
ii) due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel; and  
iii) one of the seventeen exculpatory clauses listed in article IV.2, among which appears 
the absence of fault on the part of the carrier and its agents”.176 
If the carrier successfully meets these requirements, the cargo claimant must prove either 
negligence of the carrier or lack of care for the goods by the carrier. The cargo claimant and the 
carrier are then respectively given the right to put forward their arguments as well as present 
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counterproof.177 Tetley describes the shifting of the burden of proof abovementioned as the ‘ping 
pong conduct of a cargo claim’.178 
ii. Burden of proof under the Rotterdam Rules 
The basis of the carrier’s liability is set out in article 17 of the Rotterdam Rules. Article 17 is a 
complicated and unnecessarily wordy provision. In this section the writer unravels the provision 
to explain how the burden of proof shifts from the carrier to the cargo claimant and vice versa. 
Under the Rotterdam Rules, once the cargo claimant establishes a prima facie case of loss, damage 
or delay of the cargo within the period of the carrier’s liability, the burden of proof shifts to the 
carrier who has to prove either:  
i) that its fault did not contribute to the loss suffered; or179  
ii) that the loss suffered was due to one of the maritime immunities contained in the Rotterdam 
Rules.180 
If the carrier can establish the existence of one of the maritime immunities contained in the 
Rotterdam Rules, the burden of proof shifts to the cargo claimant, who must prove any one of the 
following: 
-  that the loss suffered was a result of the carriers fault;181 or 
- that the loss suffered was probably a result of a breach of the carriers’ seaworthiness 
obligation.182 
If the cargo claimant successfully discharges this onus of proof, the carrier will be presumed liable 
but will be given the opportunity to provide counterproof asserting that the loss, damage or delay 
was not caused by or contributed to by any of the following;183 
- that the loss was not a result of unseaworthiness, or184 
                                                          
177 Katsivela op cit n 176. 
178 Tetley op cit n 173. 
179 Article 17.2 of the Rotterdam Rules. 
180 Article 17.3 of the Rotterdam Rules. 
181 Article 17.4.a and 17.4.b of the Rotterdam Rules. 
182 Article 17.5.a of the Rotterdam Rules. 
183 Katsivela op cit n 176 at page 425. 
184 Article 17.5.b of the Rotterdam Rules. 
42 
 
- that the carrier had exercised his duty to exercise due diligence in making the vessel 
seaworthy.185 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Rotterdam Rules seemingly extends the carrier’s duty to exercise 
due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel during the entire voyage (thereby enhancing the 
carrier’s liability),186 as opposed to the Hague Visby Rules which requires the carrier to maintain 
this obligation from ‘before and the beginning of the voyage’.187 In relation to cargo claims under 
the Hague Visby Rules, before the carrier is given the opportunity to rely on any of the listed 
maritime immunities, the carrier has the duty to prove that it has fulfilled the minimum standard 
of due diligence in maintaining a seaworthy vessel ‘before and at the beginning of the voyage’. 
On the other hand, the Rotterdam Rules only impose the burden of proving that it exercised due 
diligence to a minimum standard of liability on the carrier after it has had the opportunity to rely 
on one of the listed maritime immunities. Article 17(5)(a) of the Rotterdam Rules appears to place 
the burden of proving the unseaworthiness of the vessel on the cargo claimant.188 Despite the fact 
that the seaworthiness obligation is seemingly extended in the Rotterdam Rules, the carrier is still 
favoured in this regard, as proving that the vessel is unseaworthy is a difficult task for the cargo 
claimant because the carrier is in charge of the vessel. What is even more noteworthy is that the 
immunities under the Rotterdam Rules are not subject to the carrier's proof of the seaworthiness 
of the vessel.189 
Article 17.6 of the Rotterdam Rules provides that “when the carrier is relieved of part of its liability 
pursuant to this article, the carrier is liable only for that part of the loss, damage or delay that is 
attributable to the event or circumstance for which it is liable pursuant to this article”. This means 
that the carrier will only be liable for a part of the loss, damage or delay that is attributable to the 
event or circumstance for which it is liable under article 17. This provision gives the court judicial 
freedom to determine how to apportion liability.190 There is no similar provision under the Hague 
Visby Rules. 
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5.3 The immunities contained in the Hague Visby Rules and the Rotterdam Rules 
5.3.1 The Hague Visby Rules 
Article IV 
“2. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or 
resulting from: 
(a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in 
the navigation or in the management of the ship. 
(b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier. 
(c) Perils, dangers and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters. 
(d) Act of God. 
(e) Act of war. 
(f) Act of public enemies. 
(g) Arrest or restraint of princes, rulers or people, or seizure under legal process. 
(h) Quarantine restrictions. 
(i) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his agent or representative. 
(j) Strikes or lockouts or stoppage or restraint of labour from whatever cause, whether 
partial or general. 
(k) Riots and civil commotions. 
(l) Saving or attempting to save life or property at sea. 
(m) Wastage in bulk of weight or any other loss or damage arising from inherent defect, 
quality or vice of the goods. 
(n) Insufficiency of packing. 
(o) Insufficiency or inadequacy of marks. 
(p) Latent defects not discoverable by due diligence. 
(q) Any other cause arising without the actual fault or privity of the carrier, or without the 
fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier, but the burden of proof shall be on 
the person claiming the benefit of this exception to show that neither the actual fault or 
privity of the carrier nor the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier 
contributed to the loss or damage.”191 
The immunities listed above are the maritime exceptions contained in the Hague Visby Rules that 
may be relied on by a carrier to a cargo claim. In the next section (5.3.2), the writer will, identify 
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which of these exceptions are repeated in and deleted from the Rotterdam Rules and in the 
preceding section (5.4) discuss the commonly invoked exceptions. 
5.3.2 The Rotterdam Rules 
Article 17(a)-(o) of the Rotterdam Rules contains a list of exceptions that the carrier can rely on in 
the event of a cargo claim.  
It is important to note that the Rotterdam Rules contain majority of the defences contained in the 
Hague Visby Rules with the exception of the negligent navigation defence, which will be examined 
in greater detail in the section below.192  
5.4 Overview of the defences commonly invoked in light of modern day maritime trade 
In this section the writer will focus on a select few of the exceptions that are commonly invoked 
by carriers where there is loss or damage of cargo. For the purpose of this study the primary focus 
is on the negligent navigation exception. The writer will present an in-depth background overview 
and analysis on this exception. This examination of the negligent navigation exception is 
imperative in establishing the rationale for its abolishment under the Rotterdam Rules.  
5.4.1 Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in 
the navigation or in the management of the ship  
This defence of the ‘nautical fault’ exception has been described as a ‘notorious’ defence in the 
maritime world.193According to Hare, of all the defences the nautical fault exception attracts the 
most controversy.194 
The nautical fault exception was first introduced as a defence 123 years ago by the Harter Act. It 
has since been incorporated into the Hague and Hague Visby Rules, thus is applicable to the 
majority of maritime trading nations, including South Africa, that have enacted either of these 
Rules.195 Noteworthy is the fact that this exception does not feature in the Hamburg or Rotterdam 
Rules.  
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This defense allows the carrier to escape liability, and refers specifically to the acts or omissions 
of the carrier, its agents or servants in relation to the navigation or the management of the vessel 
that leads to the damage or loss of the cargo.196 The term ‘navigation’ and the duration thereof is 
interpreted broadly.197 
Difficulty arises when interpreting the term ‘management’. Management in the context of this 
exception refers to management of the vessel and not of the cargo. The primary purpose test is 
utilised where the crew’s actions have an impact on both the vessel and the cargo.198  When 
determining what constitutes management of the vessel, one must take heed of the carrier’s 
primary obligation i.e. to exercise due diligence in maintaining a seaworthy vessel. If the crew’s 
management of the vessel is something that could have been avoided had the crew undergone 
proper training, then the carrier may not rely on this exception as the carrier would not have 
fulfilled its duty to exercise due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy. Hare lists a few 
examples of what constitutes fault in ‘management of the vessel’: 
“Transferring bunkers and vessels’ fresh water from one tank to the other with an error 
in valve sets causing damage to cargo; failing properly to secure inspection covers in 
double-bottom tanks which, when being later pressed up with fuel or water, allow ingress 
into cargo tanks; operating ships’ refrigeration equipment (used primarily for the ships’ 
own stores) improperly, thereby causing damage to cargo stowed therein; and want of 
proper attention to pumps and waste pipes used primarily for pumping a ship’s bilges 
have all been treated as fault in management of the vessel”.199 
According to Hare, an issue that often surfaces when invoking the negligent navigation defence is 
a question of whether the error in navigation arose as a ‘bona fide error made by a competent 
seaman’ or where a mariner relies on ‘charts or other information or navigational aids incorrectly 
supplied or updated by the owner in want of its obligation to exercise due diligence to make the 
ship seaworthy’.200 Hare points out that principle of causation is utilised to resolve this issue.201 
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As mentioned in Chapter 3 of this study, the carrier has an obligation to make the vessel seaworthy 
and this requirement of seaworthiness comprises three aspects i.e. the obligation is to provide a 
vessel that is properly equipped and in good physical condition, cargo-worthy and is managed by 
skilled crew members.202 Thus where an error made by a seaman in the management of the vessel 
appears to be due to incompetence, this creates doubt as to whether the vessel was manned by 
properly trained and skilled crew members. In these circumstances, it may be found that the cause 
of the loss or damage was as a result of the carrier not fulfilling its obligation to exercise due 
diligence in making the vessel seaworthy and the carrier may be unable to rely on the nautical fault 
exception due to its failure to properly man the vessel.203 
The nautical fault exception was recently invoked in The Tasman case.204 In this case, the master 
deviated from the agreed navigational route of the voyage and chose a shorter course. The vessel 
hit rocks along the new route resulting in damage to its hull. Seawater entered the vessel, but the 
master proceeded with the voyage without informing the ship-owner or relevant authorities of the 
damage. It was established that the cargo sustained water damage due to the delay of the master in 
taking appropriate measures to mitigate such damage. The master attempted to conceal the route 
deviation and grounding. It was found that the master continued to steam the vessel for a few hours 
after the grounding, fraudulently concealed the deviation of the vessel from the course plotted on 
the chart and chose not to timeously inform the relevant authorities of the damage sustained to the 
vessel. In this case the Court held that a ship owner could rely on the negligent navigation 
exception contained in the Hague Visby Rules based on ‘barratry’, thus introducing barratry as the 
only qualification to this exception.205 Barratry is established when “damage has resulted from an 
act or omission of the master or crew done with  intent  to  cause  damage,  or  recklessly  and  with  
knowledge  that  damage  would  probably  result”.206 However, it was held that the master's actions 
did not amount to barratry, instead the master's intent as pleaded, was to derive a benefit for himself 
i.e. concealing the unauthorised deviation from the agreed route and choosing not to timeously 
inform the relevant authorities of the damage done to the vessel, thereby attempting to evade 
liability.  
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This exception exonerates the carrier from cargo loss or damage that occurred as a result of fire, 
provided that the fire did not occur due to the actual fault or privity of the carrier. The carrier will 
therefore be liable if the fire was a result of his personal fault. The carrier however, will not be 
liable for the damage or loss caused by the fire that is a result of the negligent actions of its servants 
or agents.207 The question of whether personal fault is in existence is a question of fact based on 
the surrounding circumstances of each case.208 
The fire exception is one of the two exceptions listed in the Hague Visby Rules which is qualified 
by the requirement that the loss or damage was not caused by actual fault or privity of the carrier.209 
In order to rely on any of the listed exceptions, the carrier must prove that it has exercised due 
diligence in making the vessel seaworthy and cargo-worthy before and at the commencement of 
the voyage. However, in relation to the fire exception, the carrier must prove lack of its actual fault 
or privity in addition to proving the exercise of due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy.210 
The cargo claimant bears the onus of establishing actual fault or privity on the part of the carrier, 
and the carrier must prove the fire exception it wishes to rely on.211 
Determining ‘actual fault or privity’ is a difficult task for the cargo claimant and the level of 
difficulty is amplified where the carrier is a company.212 In practice, companies act through their 
agents and it is often a complex task to decide whether the negligent act in question is to be 
considered as an act of the organisation or that of its agents.213 It has been held that the actual fault 
or privity required is not that of someone who is merely a servant or agent of the company i.e. 
liable on the basis of vicarious liability.214 Instead the ‘actual fault or privity’ required is that of 
someone whose actions are considered to be that of the company.215 Such person can be described 
as the ‘directing mind’ of the company.216 
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Carriers are entitled to delegate performance of certain duties to its servants or agents and are 
considered to have adequately fulfilled such duties provided that due care was exercised in 
delegating such duties.217 The negligence of such subordinates will not usually equate to ‘actual 
fault or privity’ on the part of the carrier.218 In the event that the carrier delegates performance of 
certain duties to the master of the vessel (as is often done in practice), it is required to adequately 
supervise the masters actions.219 A lack of such supervision may equate to ‘actual fault or privity’ 
on the part of the carrier, preventing the carrier from relying on such exception.220 
Wilson explains that English carriers rarely rely on the fire exception set out in the Hague Visby 
Rules, but rather turn to section 502(1) of the UK Merchant Shipping Act (the Act).221 Section 502 
of the Act deals with the exclusion of liability. According to Wilson, the fire exception set out 
under the Hague Visby Rules will soon become even less popular among English carriers due to 
the replacement of section 502(1) of the 1894 Act with section 18 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
of 1979 (the ‘1979 Act’).222 Under section 18 of the 1979 Act, the cargo claimant bears the burden 
of proving that the fire was a result of the carrier’s “personal act or omission, committed with 
intent to cause such loss, or recklessly, and with knowledge that such loss would probably result”. 
This would be difficult for the cargo claimant to prove due to the subjectivity of the 
qualification.223 
However according to Wilson there are two advantages that are afforded to carriers under the 
Hague Visby Rules that are not present under the UK Merchant Shipping Act.224 Firstly, the Hague 
Visby Rules apply to all carriers who are subject to the Rules, while the UK Merchant Shipping 
Act only applies to owners of British ships.225 Secondly, the UK Merchant Shipping Act can only 
be relied upon in this instance when the fire is on the carrying vessel itself, however, the fire 
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exception under the Hague Visby Rules extends to cargo damage or loss resulting from fire that 
occurred at any stage during the entire shipping operations i.e. from tackle to tackle.226 
The South African Merchant Shipping Act,227 does not contain a provision similar to that contained 
in section 18 of the UK Merchant Shipping Act pertaining to fire exceptions. The South African 
Merchant Shipping Act gives effect to the provisions of the fire exception set out in the Hague 
Rules.228 
It was held in the Maxine Footwear229 case (the facts of this case are mentioned in Chapter 3 of 
this study), that the fire exception under the Hague Visby Rules cannot be invoked where the 
carrier failed to exercise due diligence in maintaining a seaworthy vessel from the period ‘before 
and at the beginning of the voyage’, and the loss or damage to cargo resulted from such failure. 
The ship owner in this case did not bear any ‘actual fault or privity’ however, it failed to exercise 
due diligence in maintaining a seaworthy vessel at the required period and the loss was a result of 
this failure.230 When the question arises whether the carrier can rely on this immunity where there 
are both unseaworthiness and fire on the vessel, it will be answered by applying the principle of 
causation.  
Despite the complexities arising due to the qualification of ‘actual fault or privity’, the fire 
exception proves helpful in that it extends to the coverage of damage caused to the cargo due to 
fire extinguishing methods as well as smoke damage.231 
5.4.3 Perils, dangers and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters 
This exception exonerates the carrier from cargo loss or damage that occurs due to natural or 
accidental occurrences out at sea. This exception according to Wilson is in scope broader than that 
of the ‘act of God’ immunity in that it extends to any damage or loss caused by “risks peculiar to 
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the sea, or to the navigation of a ship at sea, which cannot be avoided by the exercise of reasonable 
care”.232 
It may therefore be invoked where loss or damage is a result of the vessel being steered onto rocks 
in a gale, vessel collision,233 or heavy weather etc.234 Where a vessel collides with another vessel 
and there is damage or loss, in order for the carrier to successfully invoke this immunity, the carrier 
must not be at fault.235 
According to Hare, heavy weather as a peril of the sea is the most commonly invoked defence by 
carriers.236 The Hague Visby Rules allow the carrier to escape liability for a cargo claim arising 
due to heavy weather. A common misconception is that heavy weather as a defence to a cargo 
claim is synonymous with ‘bad weather’.237Almost 90% of the globes shipping trade is governed 
by the Hague or Hague Visby Rules. However these jurisdictions may interpret the phrase ‘heavy 
weather’ differently; some applying it broadly while others applying it more narrowly e.g. 
American, English, Australian and South African courts have all attached their own interpretations 
of this phrase.238 
In order for a carrier to escape liability in a cargo claim on the basis of heavy weather, American 
courts require the cargo loss or damage to be a result of a severe storm that could not have been 
prevented, suggesting a degree of unpredictability.239 It may prove difficult to rely on this defense 
in the US due to accurate modern weather forecasting techniques that eliminate the element of 
unpredictability of the weather. It is clear that the US courts adopt a narrow approach when 
applying this defense and the success of the carrier depends on the merits of the case.240 
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It was held by Lord Herschell of the English House of Lords that: “There must be some casualty, 
something which could not be foreseen as one of the necessary incidents of the voyage.”241 This 
suggests that English courts allow the carrier to rely on the ‘peril of the sea’ immunity even if the 
heavy weather that caused the loss or damage was reasonably foreseeable, provided that there is 
some element of unpredictability to the event.242 Furthermore, the incident relied on when invoking 
this defense, need not be uncommon e.g. encountering rough sea during a voyage is not an 
uncommon incident, however it may be relied upon as an incident falling within the scope of the 
‘peril of the sea’ immunity.243 This stands, provided that the carrier has exercised due diligence in 
making the vessel seaworthy before and at the commencement of the voyage.244 This approach is 
slightly broader than that adopted by US courts. 
The Australian courts take a slightly different approach to the English Courts with regard to the 
‘peril of the sea’ exception. In The Bunga Seroja case,245 a ship sailed into a storm and encountered 
conditions that had been forecasted and expected. The cargo suffered damage and the court upheld 
the ‘peril of the sea’ immunity due to the fact that it had found that the master took reasonable 
steps to prevent damage of the cargo and to prepare the ship for her voyage. This suggests a much 
broader interpretation of incidents falling within the scope of the heavy weather defense, provided 
that the carrier can prove that it exercised due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy before and 
at the commencement of the voyage. This decision is however only binding in Australia. 
South African courts interpret the relevant provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,246 in a 
manner similar to that of English Courts. In order for a carrier invoking this defence to be 
successful, it must prove that cargo loss or damage is as a result of the sea’s wind or waves and 
not any incident out of the sea.247 Even when foreseen and not uncommon incidents are 
encountered during a voyage, these may fall within the scope of this exception provided that there 
is some element of unpredictability and that such damage did not arise from want of the carrier 
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exercising due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy before and at the commencement of the 
voyage.248 
5.4.4 Insufficiency of packaging 
This defence exonerates the carrier from liability where there is cargo loss or damage due to 
insufficient packaging. The shipper is under most circumstances responsible for the packaging of 
the cargo including containers.249 Thus where there is insufficiency of packaging, it is the fault of 
the shipper and this is the rationale on which this defence is based. Insufficient packaging does not 
refer to the normal or traditional packaging in the trade. It refers to the packaging of cargo based 
on a number of surrounding circumstances i.e. “the nature of the goods, the way the packing is 
made, packing usages and other variants of the journey”.250 It is for this reason that the carrier 
cannot be liable for damages resulting from want of proper packaging, when the packaging of the 
cargo is performed by or on behalf of the shipper.251 
The nature of the goods, the existence of a container and of a clean bill of lading are three important 
factors considered in determining whether the carrier will be exonerated of liability using this 
defence.252 In the event that the cargo is conferred for loading and it is packaged in a manifestly 
insufficient manner and the carrier accepts it for loading, then it may run into difficulty when 
invoking this defence.253 A clean bill of lading in the hands of the endorsee for value is conclusive 
proof of the condition of the cargo (this includes the packaging that the cargo is shipped in).254 If 
the carrier is aware of the insufficiency or unsuitability of the packaging, it would be bound by a 
higher standard of proper care of the cargo during the voyage.255 Thus when a carrier who has 
knowledge of the insufficiency of the packaging issues a clean bill of lading,256 he cannot escape 
liability by invoking the insufficiency of packaging defence under the Hague Visby and Rotterdam 
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Rules.257 Under both the Hague Visby and Rotterdam Rules,258 the carrier “is estopped from doing 
so because of the third party's good faith and reliance upon the transport document”.259 Therefore, 
in order to rely on this immunity, the carrier must qualify it’s reservation in respect of the 
packaging of the cargo on the mates receipt and on the face of the bill of lading, in order to draw 
to the attention of third parties its reservations regarding the packaging of the cargo.260 The same 
applies equally to the insufficiency or inadequacy of marks and the inherent vice exception. 
In Silver v Ocean,261 a cargo of cans of frozen eggs were shipped, and the bill of lading did not 
contain any reservations. Thus, a clean bill of lading ‘in apparent good order and condition’ was 
issued. When the cargo was unloaded, it was evident that a few of the cans were damaged i.e. some 
contained gashes and pinholes. The court held that the gashes appearing on the cans were 
‘discernible by reasonable external examination’ and the carrier was therefore estopped from 
denying that the cans which were gashed were shipped ‘in good order and condition’. It was 
however found that the pinholes on the cans were not evident upon reasonable external visible 
examination and the carrier was therefore able to successfully defend itself on this ground.262 Thus 
where the insufficiency of packaging of the cargo is discernible by reasonable external 
examination, the carrier cannot successfully rely on the insufficiency of packaging or inadequacy 
of marks defence. 
5.4.5 Insufficiency or inadequacy of marks 
This defence exonerates the carrier from liability where there is cargo loss or damage due to 
insufficiency or inadequacy of marks. It is evident by the wording of this exception that it contains 
two exceptions for the carrier i.e. exoneration of the carrier’s liability where there is either 
insufficiency or secondly inadequacy of marks. The shipper has the duty of providing the leading 
marks necessary for the carrier to identify the cargo.263 Therefore, where there is insufficiency or 
inadequacy of marks it is the fault of the shipper and not the carrier.264 The shipper is exposed to 
strict liability for inaccurate information regarding the cargo i.e. insufficient marking. The 
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rationale for this stems from the fact that, it is deemed that the shipper guarantees the accuracy of 
the information required for the compilation of the contract particulars.265 
5.4.6. Latent defects not discoverable by due diligence 
This defence exonerates the carrier from liability where there is cargo loss or damage due to a 
latent defect on the vessel or of equipment on the vessel that is not discoverable by due diligence.266 
In relation to this defence, a latent defect refers to flaws with the vessel or cargo holding equipment 
that would not be discovered readily by reasonable inspection.267 
This is a common law exclusion of liability that is incorporated into both the Hague Visby and 
Rotterdam Rules. The difference between the provisions in the two sets of rules, is the duration of 
the obligation to exercise due diligence. It is evident from the wording of this exception, that it 
coincides with the carrier’s obligation to exercise due diligence in providing a seaworthy vessel.  
However, the two are not the same.268 There are three fundamental differences between the two. 
Firstly, the latent defect exception requires, as a prerequisite, that the defect in question could not 
have been discovered by due diligence regardless of whether there is proof that the discovery took 
place.269 In contrast under both the Hague Visby Rules and the Rotterdam Rules, the exercise of 
due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy is mandatory and therefore must occur.270 Secondly, 
seaworthiness under the Hague Visby and the Rotterdam Rules refers to the vessel's seaworthiness, 
cargo worthiness, equipment and crew; while the latent defect exception only relates to the vessel 
and the cargo's handling equipment.271 Thirdly, as explained in chapter 3, under the Hague Visby 
Rules, the carrier has the duty to exercise due diligence in providing a seaworthy vessel from 
before and at the beginning of the voyage, however under the Rotterdam Rules, the carrier has 
such duty throughout the voyage. Thus, under the Rotterdam Rules the obligation to provide a 
seaworthy vessel, like the latent defect exception, is applicable throughout the duration of the 
voyage and not just before and at the commencement of the voyage.272 
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5.5 Rationale for the abolishing of the negligent navigation exception  
The nautical fault exception is an unpopular defence in a number of countries that have primarily 
cargo owner interests such as; Austria, Romania, Syria, Jordan and Botswana, which are some of 
the signatories of the Hamburg Rules that has done away with this defence. The defence does not 
feature in the Hamburg and the Rotterdam Rules. To understand the reasoning for the abolition of 
the exception in the Rotterdam Rules, one has to understand the rationale for its inclusion, rooted 
in the Harter Act and for its exclusion from the Hamburg Rules.  
The Harter Act of 1893 dates back approximately one hundred and twenty three years. During the 
19th century, once the vessel and subsequently the cargo had left the carrier’s physical care, the 
carrier had little or no instant means of communication with the crew. This was due to the lack of 
technology and instant means of messaging in this era. Thus, the prime reason for the inclusion of 
the negligent navigation exception was that it would have been unfair to hold the carrier liable for 
any “act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in the 
navigation or in the management of the ship”,273 after the vessel left its care and it had no means 
of communicating with the master or crew of the vessel throughout the duration of the voyage. 
While negotiating the Hamburg Rules, a minority of the delegates favoured the retention of the 
negligent navigation exception.274 However, the vast majority felt that this exception “was no 
longer justified, particularly since it had no parallel in other fields of law relating to contract. The 
compromise between these points of view was to delete the nautical fault exception but to set the 
limits of liability of the carrier at relatively low amounts (only slightly above those of the Visby 
Protocol) and to allow the limits of liability to be broken only in case of the carrier’s serious 
misconduct”.275 “Another element of the compromise was to create an exception to the ‘presumed 
fault’ basis on the carrier’s liability by requiring the claimant to prove the carrier’s fault or neglect 
in the case of loss, damage or delay in delivery caused by fire”.276 
Preceding these negotiations, there have been more informative discussions and debates on the 
abolishment of the negligent navigation exception and it should be noted that the view favoured is 
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that the exception should be abolished. The CMI pointed out that the negligent navigation 
exception and the fire exceptions are the ‘traditional exceptions’ contained in the Hague and Hague 
Visby Rules and that there is strong opposition against retaining these exceptions, especially from 
cargo owning nations.277 
Furthermore, research reveals that the global industry perceptions are that the removal of the 
exception from the Rotterdam Rules is a fundamental step towards modernising and harmonising 
international transport law. The rationale behind the deletion of the negligent navigation exception 
is therefore, to hold ship owners to the same standards of liability as operators of other modes of 
transport,278 thus creating a more equitable balance between the interests of the cargo owner and 
the ship owner. In addition modern day technology e.g. Global Position Services (GPS) reduces 
accidents due to error in navigation from occurring. 
The UNCITRAL reports further reveal that during the discussions held by the Working Group 
tasked with facilitating the negotiations surrounding the Rotterdam Rules, a number of delegates 
were of the view that the negligent navigation exception should not be abolished as it would result 
in an ‘economic impact on insurance practice’ as a result of an alteration of the current “risk 
allocation between the carrier and the cargo owner”.279 There were however an even larger number 
of delegates who did not agree with this view. This increased cost implication arises from large 
cargo claims against the negligent navigation of the vessel by the crewmen, as the ship owner may 
no longer rely on the negligent navigation exception.280 However, these increased cost implications 
may be minimised by the provisions in the Rotterdam Rules (Article 59 and 60) that allow the ship 
owner to limit its liability, as well as the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime 
Claims, 1976.281 In addition, to soften the blow of the cost implications of the abolishment of the 
negligent navigation exception, ship owners may also reasonably increase freight charges. This 
does not mean that cargo owners would be exposed to excessive costs of freight, as there will be a 
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penalty by industrial mechanisms for carriers who increase the cost of freight in a deceitful 
manner.282 The best way for carriers to avoid the increased cost implications would be for them to 
be proactive by preventing accidents from occurring due to negligent navigation i.e. improve and 
enhance safety and security measures, as well as focusing on methods to eliminate or reduce 
liability for negligent navigation.283 
5.6 Conclusion 
The need for the negligent navigation exception no longer exists in the modern sea trade industry. 
From the above findings, it would seem that the speculated cost implications attached to such 
abolition, may be avoided or minimised by ship owners’ being more proactive when implementing 
safety standards and regulations. It is therefore submitted that, while the Rotterdam Rules has its 
inherent flaws e.g. the complexity of the burden of proof provisions, the redeeming feature of the 
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6 Chapter 6: Conclusion  
 
Due to the evolving nature of international trade, the laws governing sea trade are meant to be 
flexible and subject to changes brought about by globalisation and modern technological 
advancements. The Hague and Hague Visby Rules have been widely accepted by nations which 
are considered to have a strong influence in the maritime trade industry. As illustrated in this study, 
the Hague and Hague Visby Rules have been widely accepted by nations with a strong maritime 
influence; unlike the Rotterdam Rules, which have not been widely accepted and notably, none of 
South Africa’s major trading partners (the UK, the US, China etc.) have ratified it.   
As pointed out in this study, the Hague and Hague Visby Rules have their roots in the Harter Act, 
which dates back to the 1800s and therefore does not take into consideration the evolution of 
modern day trade and technology. Therefore, it is submitted that while the Rotterdam Rules do not 
truly enhance the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation by extending the duration of the obligation 
beyond the commencement of the voyage, as it is merely a repetition of good shipping practices 
already in force; it does however, bring some clarity to cargo claims by expressly providing an 
extension of the carriers obligation. Furthermore, the Rules bring sea carriers’ liability in line with 
that of carriers’ from other modes of transport (e.g. rail and road carriers) by removing the 
negligent navigation exception, which is a step in the right direction for the harmonisation of 
modern carriage laws.  
However, the Rotterdam Rules comprise of ninety six narrow and complex provisions, while the 
Hague Visby Rules contain merely ten, which may be in need of modernisation, but are more 
reader friendly. It is submitted that, one of the reasons many nations have not welcomed the 
Rotterdam Rules and many maritime practitioners are wary of these Rules, is due to the fact that 
adhering to ninety six new as oppose to the familiar ten articles seems like a daunting task. Among 
these ninety six provisions provided for in the Rotterdam Rules, are the provisions pertaining to 
the burden of proof requirements in a cargo claims. It is further submitted that the common 
interpretation of the said provisions, defeat the purpose of the proposed extension of the carrier’s 
liability and operates prejudicially against the cargo claimant. In contrast, the burden of proof 
requirements set out in the Hague Visby Rules have over the years through judicial interpretation 
been applied in a fairer and more just manner. It therefore seems that the only redeemable 
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characteristic (in terms of liability) under the Rotterdam Rules is that the negligent navigation 
exception does not feature in it.  
Furthermore, it does not seem practical or feasible for nations to completely abandon the 
precedents regarding liability that are attached to the Harter Act, Hague and Hague Visby Rules 
for a completely new regime which, may conflict with other international conventions and is 
subject to different interpretations by different jurisdictions due to its ambiguous wording. This 
would create divergence and not the unity that was hoped for. Thus, it is submitted that due to the 
fact that the Rotterdam Rules have not been widely accepted, the logical and rational manner in 
which to proceed would be to merely modify the current widely accepted carriage regimes. 
Thereby, allowing the many judicial precedents and interpretations created under these regimes to 
live a longer life span as opposed to the ratification of the Rotterdam Rules.  
Even though the Rotterdam Rules have not received the widespread acceptance that was hoped 
for; it is proposed that from an academic and policy making perspective, further scrutiny of the 
Rules is of value due to the fact that it is an innovative and plausible international carriage 
convention that incorporates significant provisions that were not successfully incorporated by its 
predecessors e.g. it is a multimodal convention allowing for door-to-door coverage. Thus, as much 
as it has its inherent flaws, the Rules are a step in the right direction towards modernisation and 
innovation in the maritime transport industry. It may be more widely accepted if it is modified in 
order to properly balance the competing interests of ship owners and cargo owners, and clears up 
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